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Systemic Risk Oversight and the Shifting
Balance of State and Federal Authority
over Insurance
Patricia A. McCoy*
The state-based model of U.S. insurance regulation has been remarkably
enduring to date, in part because the traditional rationales for a greater federal
roleefficiency, uniformity, and consumer protection—have not succeeded in
displacing it. However, the 2008 financial crisis, the federal government’s
unprecedented bailouts of parts of the insurance sector, and the need for a
coordinated international approach radically shifted the debate about the
proper allocation of power between the federal government and the states by
supplanting traditional concerns about efficiency, uniformity, and consumer
protection in insurance with a new federal mandate to control systemic risk.
Unprepared and ill-equipped to counter this shift, the states face the biggest
threat to their domination of U.S. insurance regulation in years.
Already, the federal government has made inroads into insurance regulation
for purposes of systemic risk oversight. That federal presence creates several
openings for a broader federal role in insurance than just regulation of
systemically important insurers. For instance, solvency regulation, which
traditionally has been reserved to the states, increasingly could be subsumed
under the rubric of systemic risk. Over time, additional federal incursions could
include higher reporting requirements for insurers, regulation of discrete,
systemically risky activities (regardless of an insurer’s size), oversight of captive
reinsurers, and greater consolidated supervision of insurance groups.

* Liberty Mutual Insurance Professor, Boston College Law School. This Article was made possible
through generous research support from the University of Connecticut School of Law and Boston
College Law School, and it benefited from comments by Shauhin Talesh and the other participants in
the September 19, 2014, symposium, “The Relationship Between Insurance and Legal Regulation:
Normative, Theoretical, and Empirical Perspectives,” at the University of California, Irvine School of
Law. Karen Breda provided invaluable reference librarian assistance. The author also thanks Brian
Atchinson, John Cogan, Kathleen Engel, Andromachi Georgosouli, Bill Goddard, Miriam Goldby,
Charles Klingman, Peter Kochenburger, Rosa Lastra, Tom Leonardi, Brendan Maher, Philip
Rawlings, Jim Rebitzer, Dan Schwarcz, Steve Schwarcz, Tom Sullivan, and Terri Vaughan for their
insights into the extent and nature of systemic risk in insurance and the ensuing debate over federal
regulation. None of those individuals is to blame for the views expressed in this Article; that
responsibility is mine alone.
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the federal government dominates financial services
regulation with the singular exception of insurance regulation, which traditionally
has been reserved to the states. This state-based system has long been criticized by
some as too costly for insurers and consumers due to the lack of a uniform
national standard. Nevertheless, so far the touted inefficiencies in state-based
insurance have never succeeded in shifting insurance regulation wholesale to the
federal government.1
In part, the continued dominance of state insurance regulation rests on state
regulators’ relative success in managing two risks: market conduct and solvency.2
After the 2008 financial crisis, however, systemic risk emerged as a new topic of
concern in insurance. This development altered the calculus of the allocation of
authority for insurance regulation between the states and the federal government.
After 2008, concerns about industry cost savings and a single set of national rules
for efficiency’s sake moved to the back burner in the debate over the proper
federal role in the oversight of insurance. Instead, systemic risk and global
cooperation became the new leitmotifs of that debate.
Suffice it to say, insurers and state insurance regulators have been illprepared for this change. In landmark reform legislation in 2010, Congress
bestowed jurisdiction on the federal government to regulate systemic risk in
insurance, to the consternation of the insurance industry and state insurance
commissioners. Both groups oppose systemic risk oversight of insurers by the
federal government based on three main arguments. One is that insurance
companies do not pose systemic risk because they do not have mismatches
between short-term liabilities and long-term assets that could make them
vulnerable to runs. The second is that the meltdown of the global insurer
American International Group (AIG) was not caused by insurance but rather by
derivatives trading in an overseas noninsurance affiliate. Finally, these
constituencies argue that insurance companies survived 2008 relatively intact
thanks to the effectiveness of state insurance regulation.
These arguments, however, have not kept pace with the evolution in theories
of systemic risk since 2008. The experience with runs in the shadow-banking
sector in 2008 highlighted the potential for runs in certain insurance products,
particularly in the life insurance industry. The role of insurers as financiers of
short-term liabilities has implications for the creation of systemic risk elsewhere in
the financial system. In the wake of AIG, the hazards posed by weak group
oversight of insurance groups to financial stability also received attention.
1. For an account of that history, see FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, HOW
TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE THE SYSTEM OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
1 (2013) [hereinafter FIO MODERNIZATION REPORT], https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/
reports-and-notices/Documents/How%20to%20Modernize%20and%20Improve%20the%20System
%20of%20Insurance%20Regulation%20in%20the%20United%20States.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA9ZFBRE].
2. See id. at 13.
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Based on these insights, the federal government’s approach to systemic risk
in insurance has become a microcosm of the larger debate over sources of
systemic risk. In this Article, I examine two theories of systemic risk that have
surfaced in decisions by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC or the
Council)3 designating systemically important insurers. I then consider the broader
implications of these decisions for the future federal regulation of insurance.
One of FSOC’s theories derives from a classic theory of bank runs in which
a mismatch between short-term liabilities and long-term assets exposes financial
institutions to a spike in demand for immediate withdrawals in cash. In the
insurance context, FSOC has invoked that theory three times to date based on the
cash surrender features in certain life insurance and annuity products. The Council
has also pointed to systemic risk created by runs on other products offered by
noninsurance affiliates in insurance groups. Finally, FSOC has cited concerns
about runs in other parts of the financial system to justify its focus on the role of
large insurance companies as suppliers of short-term credit to other vulnerable
counterparties.
In addition, FSOC has announced a second, more aggressive theory of
systemic risk that focuses on the potential adverse macroeconomic repercussions
from loss of coverage by a dominant insurer, whether that withdrawal of coverage
is voluntary or due to the insurer’s insolvency (and regardless of the cause of any
insolvency). Despite the novel nature of this theory, it has not been well explained
in FSOC’s formulations to date. Nevertheless, this fuzzy rationale has had realworld consequences because FSOC has relied on it so far in designating at least
one insurance company as systemically risky.
Taken together, these theories point to a growing federal role in insurance
regulation. To the extent that life insurance and certain annuity policies grant early
redemption rights at policyholders’ initiative, the life insurance industry faces a real
but uncertain risk of runs that will continue to attract FSOC’s attention. In
addition, insurance companies engage in other discrete activities that have been
found to be systemically risky, including securities lending, derivatives trading, and
sponsorship of money market mutual funds. These activities are certain to draw
heightened federal scrutiny and could subject insurance companies regardless of
size to federal regulation of those activities in years to come.
As a corollary, the fact that these same systemically risky activities can be
conducted in noninsurance subsidiaries of insurance groups—as AIG made
clear—has propelled effective consolidated group supervision to the forefront of
policy discussions. The global reach of internationally active insurance groups and
pronouncements on group oversight by international regulatory bodies highlight
3. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010 created FSOC
and charged that body, among other things, with designating nonbank financial services providers
that “could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States” as systemically important
financial institutions (SIFIs) subject to enhanced prudential regulation by the Federal Reserve Board.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 113(a)(1), 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1) (2012)).
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the fact that only the federal government has the potential jurisdiction and treatymaking authority to conduct that supervision effectively. Finally, the solvency
concerns that underpin both of FSOC’s theories of systemic risk are likely to pave
the way for much more intrusive federal involvement in risk-based capital
standards and other types of solvency regulation, first for internationally active
insurance groups and eventually for the entire insurance industry.
In short, systemic risk regulation by the federal government, both singly and
in tandem with international bodies, is a game changer. It is likely to transform the
locus of insurance regulation both in ways that are predictable and others that are
not. Yet the larger implications of this change for continued state dominance in
insurance regulation are not well recognized. To that extent, federal oversight of
systemic risk in insurance has the stealth potential to affect the insurance industry
by imposing certain federal regulatory standards industry wide.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Historically, the states have held the predominant role in insurance
regulation. This arrangement stands in stark contrast to the regulation of banking
and securities, which both gravitated inexorably toward federal regulatory
domination in the twentieth century. In this brief historical overview, I discuss the
states’ central role in insurance regulation and the limited federal intervention in
that realm through 2009.
A. Through 1945
In the early decades of the republic, the states made the first forays into U.S.
insurance regulation. New Hampshire appointed the first insurance commissioner
in 1851, and other states quickly followed suit.4 Less than twenty years later, the
Supreme Court issued a seminal ruling that barred federal intervention in
insurance via the Commerce Clause. In that 1868 decision, in Paul v. Virginia, the
Supreme Court ruled that the business of insurance did not constitute interstate
commerce for purposes of the Commerce Clause.5 As a consequence of that
decision, Congress was divested of the power to regulate insurance at the federal
level, at least under the Commerce Clause, thereby clothing the states with
primacy in insurance regulation. A few short years after Paul was handed down,
the New York Superintendent of Insurance, George W. Miller, convened the
inaugural meeting of what is known today as the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), a voluntary organization consisting of the
insurance commissioners of all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the
American territories.6 The NAIC’s creation further consolidated state control over
insurance regulation.
4. FIO MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
5. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868).
6. FIO MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 1, at 11; Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the
United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 625, 629–30 (1999).
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In 1944, the Supreme Court reversed its decision in Paul and ruled that
insurance could in fact constitute interstate commerce, thereby giving Congress
the constitutional power to regulate insurance transactions crossing state lines.7
Quickly, the states rallied in opposition to that decision. In response, in 1945,
Congress enacted the reverse preemption provision in the McCarran-Ferguson
Act,8 which provides that no federal law may invalidate, impair, or supersede state
laws governing the business of insurance unless the federal law specifically relates
to the business of insurance.9 With the passage of McCarran-Ferguson, the states’
commanding role in the regulation of insurance was further entrenched and
federal attempts to oversee insurance faced even higher barriers to success.
B. Post–McCarran-Ferguson Through 2009
Federal oversight of traditional insurance activities and products is limited
today, and it was even more limited before the 2008 financial crisis and the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act10
(the Dodd-Frank Act or Dodd-Frank) in 2010. Before Dodd-Frank, federal
oversight of insurance fell into three discrete categories. First, federal regulators
and courts deemed some traditional insurance products to also constitute
“banking” or “securities,” thus triggering the application of federal banking or
securities laws on top of (or sometimes to the exclusion of) state insurance laws.11
Second, a major federal statute enacted in 1974 titled the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) subjected employee benefits—including pension,
health insurance, and disability benefits offered to employees through the
workplace—to strict fiduciary standards under federal law.12 As a result, insurance
companies that serve as underwriters or plan administrators of health insurance,
7. United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 552–53 (1944).
8. Act of March 9, 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33–34 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–
1015 (2012)).
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012).
10. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
11. For instance, in 1959, the Supreme Court held that variable annuities, which had long
been regulated as insurance by the states, also constituted securities for purposes of the federal
securities laws. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 68–73
(1959). Variable life insurance is similarly federally regulated as a security. Later, in 1995, the Supreme
Court held that national banks could sell fixed and variable annuities as agents. NationsBank of N.C.
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 264 (1995). Meanwhile, the federal regulator for
national banks, the Comptroller of the Currency, permits national banks and their subsidiaries to
underwrite credit insurance, municipal bond insurance, and single-interest insurance (which insures
banks against loss or damage to personal property that serves as bank collateral) based on the
determination that such insurance is a banking product that is incidental to the business of banking.
See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY [OCC], Interpretive Letter No. 338, 1985
OCC Ltr. LEXIS 23 (May 2, 1985); OCC, Interpretive Letter No. 283, 1984 OCC Ltr. LEXIS 37
(March 16, 1984); see also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 302(b), 113 Stat. 1338,
1407 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6712(b) (2012)); Debt Cancellation Contracts and Debt
Suspension Agreements, 12 C.F.R. § 37 (2016). See generally 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012).
12. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
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disability insurance, or pension benefits offered by covered employers must
comply with ERISA. Finally, the federal government instituted a number of social
insurance programs,13 the most important being Social Security retirement14 and
disability benefits,15 Medicare health benefits for the elderly,16 Medicaid health
benefits for the poor,17 unemployment insurance,18 and some catastrophe
insurance (most notably, flood insurance,19 nuclear liability insurance under the
Price-Anderson Act,20 and terrorism risk insurance21).
Outside the realm of traditional insurance products, private insurance
companies may intersect with federal regulation in other ways, depending on their
activities. Insurance companies that act as securities broker-dealers have to comply
with the broker-dealer registration and oversight provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.22 Insurers that serve as investment advisers have to
observe the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,23 while those that sponsor mutual
funds or private funds must obey the Investment Company Act of 1940.24 After
13. Another major social insurance program—workers compensation for private-sector
employees who are injured on the job—is administered by individual states. See Workers Compensation,
LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/workers_compensation [https://perma.cc/
R4AQ-5S4A] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016).
14. See Retirement Benefits, SOC. SEC., https://www.ssa.gov/retire/ [https://perma.cc/P8HSUGW4] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016).
15. See Disability Benefits, SOC. SEC., https://www.ssa.gov/disabilityssi/ [https://perma.cc/
W9XV-PW9Y] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016); see also SOC. SEC., DISABILITY BENEFITS 4 (2015),
https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10029.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9WJ-57NM] (describing benefits).
16. See What Medicare Covers, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicarecovers/index.html [https://perma.cc/3CDZ-TWLN] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) (describing
benefits).
17. See About Us, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/about-us/about-us.html
[https://perma.cc/37LZ-APDG] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) (“Medicaid provides health coverage to
low-income people and is one of the largest payers for health care in the United States.”).
18. Unemployment insurance is offered jointly by the federal government and the states. See
Unemployment Insurance, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/general/topic/unemploymentinsurance [https://perma.cc/YM8F-RJWB] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016).
19. See The National Flood Insurance Program, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/national-floodinsurance-program [https://perma.cc/D4GE-XEG3] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) (describing
program).
20. Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2012(i)
(2012)); see also Price-Anderson Act, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/gc/price-anderson-act
[https://perma.cc/MK5C-WJ9N] (last visited Mar. 13, 2016); Nuclear Liability Insurance (Price-Anderson
Act), NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_nuclear_liability_
insurance.htm [https://perma.cc/K69N-RMAA] (last updated Jan. 5, 2016) (describing coverage).
21. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Pages/program.aspx [https://perma.cc/3Z2322E6] (last updated Mar. 2, 2015) (describing program); Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), NAT’L
ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_tria.htm [https://perma.cc/2JWYZ3DU] (last visited Mar. 13, 2016) (describing program).
22. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, secs. 3(a)(4)(a), 3(a)(5)(a), 3(a)(18),
8, 9(a), 10(b), 11, 15 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See generally Guide to
Broker-Dealer Registration, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 2008), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
marketreg/bdguide.htm [https://perma.cc/482G-68VR].
23. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1
to -21 (2012)).
24. Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-
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the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 allowed insurance underwriters to become
affiliates of banks under the common control of a financial holding company,25
affected insurance companies became subject to consolidated holding company
oversight by the Federal Reserve. Insurance company affiliates of financial
holding companies must also observe the limits on interaffiliate transactions under
Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act.26
II. THE CHANGING DIMENSIONS OF THE DEBATE
As the last section discussed, federal forays into insurance regulation have
been limited to certain sectors with health insurance, variable annuities, and
pensions being the most important examples. The landmark passage of the
Affordable Care Act27 and its health insurance mandate in 2010 further expanded
the federal presence in health insurance. The federal role in social insurance has
grown as well. In these sectors, decisions by private insurers to exit parts of those
markets or other market failures compelled the federal government to step in.
Apart from these limited federal incursions, the states succeeded brilliantly in
fending off federal encroachment in insurance regulation through 2010. For over a
century, there have been campaigns from time to time to insert the federal
government into the general regulation of insurance. These campaigns have
argued for federal oversight based on traditional arguments involving efficiency,
uniformity, and consumer protection. Otherwise, none of these traditional
rationales ever gained sufficient political traction to trump the states’ predominant
role in insurance regulation.
But with the financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing federal response, the
terms of the debate changed in a radical and powerful way. For the first time
following the crisis, calls for greater federal oversight of insurance were framed in
terms of the potential systemic risk that insurance company activities posed to the
financial stability of the United States and the world. The public furor over the
federal government’s massive bailout of AIG in 200828 and the revelations about
bonuses to AIG executives in March 200929 added urgency to those calls.
Following the bailout, many considered it self-evident that the federal government
1 to -64 (2012)).
25. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 302(b), 113 Stat. 1338, 1407 (1999)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6712 (2012)). Insurance underwriters owned by savings and loan holding
companies were already subject to federal regulation under the Savings and Loan Holding Company
Act. See Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, 82 Stat. 5
(1968) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a to 1470 (2012)).
26. 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1.
27. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
28. Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Sept. 16, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20080916a.htm [https://perma.cc/6U76C75T] (“The Federal Reserve Board on Tuesday, with the full support of the Treasury Department,
authorized the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to lend up to $85 billion to the American
International Group (AIG) . . . .”).
29. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, At A.I.G., Huge Bonuses After $170 Billion
Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at A1.
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had to oversee the entire financial system, including insurance companies, in order
to contain systemic risk.
A. The Traditional Dimensions of the Debate over State Versus Federal Regulation
Historically, two of the rationales for a greater federal role in insurance were
lax corporate governance by insurers and inadequate solvency regulation by state
insurance commissioners. For example, in the early twentieth century, some of the
proposals for general federal regulation of insurance were a response to corrupt
insurance company practices and insolvencies. In 1904, a series of insurance
company scandals involving stock market manipulation, covert campaign
contributions, and officer misappropriation of policyholder funds caused
President Theodore Roosevelt to advocate federal regulation of insurance in his
annual address to Congress.30 Sixty years later, in the 1960s, a spate of auto insurer
insolvencies, combined with a lack of state guaranty funds to assist injured
policyholders, led to renewed calls for an optional federal insurance company
charter and a federal guaranty fund.31 Another string of insurance company
insolvencies in the 1980s and 1990s prompted Congress to explore the need for
federal solvency regulation of insurers.32
Although scandals and insolvencies frequently served as the impetus for
efforts to federalize insurance regulation, commonly proposals for federal
oversight invoked the need for efficiency and national uniformity as well. In his
1904 address to Congress, for instance, President Theodore Roosevelt advocated
federal intervention on grounds that insurance was “national and not local in its
application.”33 The following year, Senator John Dryden of New Jersey sought to
implement Roosevelt’s proposal by introducing a bill to create a new federal
Bureau of Insurance in the Department of Commerce and Labor, based in part on
the need to reduce “a vast amount of needless clerical labor to meet the
requirements of some fifty different States and Territories and consequent
decrease in expense rate.”34
In these early instances, efficiency and uniformity provided supplemental
rationales for legislation that was primarily meant to redress scandals. However, by
the end of the twentieth century, national uniformity became the main
justification in its own right for proposals for federal oversight. For example, the
need for a single national standard was the rationale behind a provision in the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 which mandated the creation of a new federal
agency for national insurance-agent licensing requirements, unless a majority of

30. KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: THE CASE OF
INSURANCE 57–58 (1988); President Theodore Roosevelt’s Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 6,
1904).
31. See FIO MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
32. See id. at 15–16.
33. President Theodore Roosevelt’s Annual Message to Congress, supra note 30.
34. Bill for Government Control of Insurance: To be Introduced in the Senate by John F. Dryden, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1905, at 5.
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U.S. states and territories met a 2002 statutory deadline by agreeing to reciprocal
licensing of insurance brokers and agents.35 Similarly, efficiency concerns,
including the cost of state insurance regulation,36 slow delivery of new insurance
products to market, state price regulation, and duplicative and inconsistent state
rules animated repeated proposals in the early 2000s to create national insurance
standards and an optional federal charter for insurance companies.37
While concerns over consumer protection received lip service during recent
debates, the real justification for the proposed federal reforms was reducing
regulatory red tape for national and international insurers. Advocates for a greater
federal role argued, for instance, that national uniformity would give consumers
access to innovative new insurance products regardless of where they lived; would
reduce opportunities for industry capture of regulators; would help eliminate
arbitrage and a possible race to the bottom in insurance standards; and would
improve consumer protection for policyholders and beneficiaries more
generally.38 Nevertheless, deregulation was the predominant theme of the debate,
with a stress on the cost savings to insurers from streamlining regulation nationally
and internationally.39 Despite expressions of solicitude for consumers, there was
little actual discussion of how to avoid opportunities for industry capture or
arbitrage at the federal level or how to set a single federal standard to better
protect insurance industry consumers.
Notwithstanding these repeated efforts to inject the federal government into
the general regulation of insurance for the sake of better corporate governance,
efficiency, and uniformity, the states were able to beat back those efforts and
preserve their preeminent role in insurance oversight. They succeeded in defeating
a greater federal role through two main strategies: accommodation and
recharacterization.
In the first strategy, accommodation, the states often adopted piecemeal
reforms that were designed to both harmonize regulation and convince wavering
members of Congress to preserve the status quo. For instance, the NAIC
preempted proposals to create a federal guaranty fund after the auto insurer
failures of the 1960s by adopting two model state guaranty fund acts—one for
property and casualty insurance and the other for life and health insurance—in

35. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 321, 113 Stat. 1338, 1422 (1999)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6751 (2012)). This agency was referred to as the National Association of
Registered Agents and Brokers or NARAB.
36. The Federal Insurance Office has asserted, for instance, that per dollar of premium, the
costs of state-based regulation are 6.8 times greater for an insurer doing business in the United States
than for one operating in the United Kingdom. See FIO MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 1, at
5.
37. See, e.g., id. at 16–17.
38. See, e.g., id. at 1, 5.
39. See, e.g., id. at 5, 17; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY
BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008),
http://www. treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6WRJ-TPB].
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1969 and 1970 respectively.40 Numerous states enacted these model laws41 and all
fifty states offer state guaranty funds today.42
Later, after federal scrutiny of more insurance company insolvencies in the
1980s and 1990s, the states, acting through the NAIC, adopted new risk-based
capital requirements for personal lines insurers and later developed uniform
statutory accounting principles for the industry. In addition, the states formulated
a new peer review process called the Financial Standards and Accreditation
Program that was designed to make insurance rules more consistent across the
states.43 Meanwhile, in 2002, the states defused Gramm-Leach-Bliley’s threat to
impose national insurance agent licensing requirements by certifying that thirtyfive states and territories had agreed to reciprocity in producer licensing, thereby
meeting the law’s requirements to avoid federal action by the statutory deadline.44
More recently, the NAIC has coordinated multistate market conduct examinations
of insurers and boosted the analytical power of these examinations by introducing
a new uniform data collection system in 2011 to centralize market conduct data
for use by insurance regulators in all fifty states.45
The other strategy used by states to fight federal intervention was to
recharacterize opponents’ arguments on efficiency and uniformity to emphasize the
advantages of decentralized government. States argued, for instance, that divergent
state insurance regulations produced more efficient outcomes by providing
laboratories of experimentation to determine the optimal level of regulation. In
another efficiency argument, states asserted that they were more responsive to
local conditions and consumer complaints than federal regulators. States also
pointed to tough, pro-consumer insurance commissioners as evidence that
industry capture of the states was not as easy it seemed.
These recharacterization arguments took on new life during the aftermath of
the financial crisis of 2008. Insurance companies did not suffer the same broad
threat to solvency as commercial and investment banks during the crisis, and state
insurance regulators succeeded in keeping AIG’s insurance subsidiaries afloat.
Similarly, the financial crisis brought new appreciation for the role of states as

40. See, e.g., FIO MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
41. See, e.g., id. at 15.
42. See, e.g., State Guaranty Fund Web Sites, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF INS. GUAR. FUNDS,
http://ncigf.org/public-guarantyfundwebsites [https://perma.cc/W3KN-RT8S] (last visited Feb. 14,
2016) (“All 50 states and the District of Columbia are served by property and casualty guaranty
funds.”); What is NOLHGA?, NAT’L ORG. OF LIFE & HEALTH INS. GUAR. ASS’NS,
https://www.nolhga.com/aboutnolhga/main.cfm/location/whatisnolhga [https://perma.cc/W348JQDX] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) (“The National Organization of Life and Health Insurance
Guaranty Associations (NOLHGA) is a voluntary association made up of the life and health
insurance guaranty associations of all 50 states and the District of Columbia.”).
43. See, e.g., FIO MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 1, at 16.
44. See, e.g., id. at 16.
45. See Randy A. Helder, The Market Conduct Analysis Framework, CIPR NEWSLETTER (Nat’l
Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs & Ctr. for Ins. Policy & Research, Kansas City, MO), Oct. 2012, at 16,
http://www.naic.org/cipr_newsletter_archive/vol5_market_conduct_framework.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CTW2-EGTQ].
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laboratories of experimentation. In contrast to insurance, banking regulation had
achieved increasing national uniformity through federal preemption of state
antipredatory lending laws during the years leading up to the crisis, only to blow
up when federal regulators refused to replace tougher, preempted state standards
for subprime mortgage loans with meaningful regulatory controls of their own.46
Later, it became apparent that many states had been tougher protectors of
residential mortgage borrowers than the federal government. Along with that
realization came new acknowledgment of the value of multiple gatekeepers and
calls to reduce duplicative state regulation lost some of their firepower.
Other traditional arguments for federal involvement in insurance also took a
beating. The financial crisis cast doubt on the wisdom of financial innovations
solely for innovation’s sake. Similarly, the corruption at the U.S. Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS), its capitulation to industry interests during the housing bubble,
and its demise47 belied claims that state insurance regulators would be easier to
capture than a single federal regulator. Finally, the ruinous race to the bottom in
mortgage lending standards that was fueled by the optional federal charters for
commercial banks and thrifts—and the opportunities for arbitrage they
provided48—knocked the wind out of the sails for proposals for an optional
federal charter in insurance.
In sum, until 2008 the debate over state versus federal regulation of
insurance was framed in terms of corporate governance, uniformity, and
efficiency (with lip service to consumer protection). Those justifications never
caused the states to lose their primacy in insurance regulation and lost even more
of their punch after the financial crisis. Ironically, however, with the onslaught of
the crisis, the prevailing terms of the debate shifted from uniformity and
efficiency to systemic risk, to the detriment of state insurance regulation.
B. The New Terms of the Debate
In the aftermath of 2008, policymakers first trained their focus on the
banking, securities, and derivatives sectors. But eventually they raised questions
about the insurance industry’s role—or lack thereof—as well. The main impetus
for that scrutiny was the federal government’s bailout of AIG. The distress of
financial guaranty insurers and private mortgage insurers and their importance to
the housing sector also sparked attention. With these events, the terms of the
debate over state versus federal regulation of insurance changed dramatically to
46. See KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 157–66 (2011); Patricia A. McCoy & Elizabeth
Renuart, The Legal Infrastructure of Subprime and Nontraditional Home Mortgages, in BORROWING TO LIVE:
CONSUMER AND MORTGAGE CREDIT REVISITED 110, 130–32 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky
eds., 2008).
47. For the history of OTS during this period, see ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 46, at 158–
60, 174–84, 221–23.
48. See id. at 157–63; Patricia A. McCoy, Federal Preemption, Regulatory Failure and the Race to the
Bottom in US Mortgage Lending Standards, in THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM 132 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 2010).
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encompass new concerns about systemic risk.
During their postcrisis examination of insurance, the Obama Administration
and individual members of Congress flagged certain activities of insurance
companies and groups as systemically risky. Eventually those concerns led to the
creation of the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) and the provisions on systemically
important insurers in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act in 2010.
1.

The Insurance-Related Events of 2008

Apart from two narrow segments of the insurance industry—financial
guaranty insurers and private mortgage insurers—traditional insurance
underwriters mostly sat on the sidelines during the 2008 financial crisis. Unlike
many commercial banks and investment banks, insurance companies remained
solvent throughout that period with relatively few exceptions.49 None of the core
products at issue during the crisis—subprime mortgages, residential mortgagebacked securities, or collateralized debt obligations—had been issued by
traditional insurers. Similarly, no accounts of runs like the ones that capsized
investment banks Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, depository institutions such
as Washington Mutual and Wachovia, or even money market funds such as the
Reserve Primary Fund50 appeared in the trade press’ coverage of insurance
underwriters during that period. With one exception, insurance seemed to remain
the sleepy and unglamorous outpost of financial services it had always been in
recent years.
But regrettably for the insurance industry, that exception was the precedentshattering case of AIG. The tale of AIG assumed a life of its own, with farreaching consequences for insurance and its regulation. While AIG was in some
ways an anomaly, its near-failure was so terrifying and its federal bailout so costly
that the federal government could not relinquish continued regulation of that
group. In turn, the spotlight on AIG and a few other cases of insurance company
bailouts by federal authorities prompted closer analysis of other possible sources
of systemic risk from insurance.
a.

AIG

Every industry hit by a financial crisis has its poster child. In the insurance
industry in 2008, that poster child was the world’s largest international insurance

49.

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-583, INSURANCE MARKETS: IMPACTS
REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE 2007-2009 FINANCIAL CRISIS 9 (2013), http://
www.gao.gov/assets/660/655612.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR74-32RW]. Life insurers were more likely
to experience financial distress during this period than general property and casualty insurers. Even
so, most life insurers survived the crisis intact. See id.; Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz,
Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1569, 1571–72 (2014).
50. For a description of those runs, see ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 46, at 87–90, 94, 102–
21.
OF AND
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group,51 AIG.
i.

AIG’s Credit Default Swap Activities

During the early 2000s, AIG embarked on a path to ruin by selling hundreds
of billions of dollars in over-the-counter credit default swaps (CDS) on subprime
mortgage collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) through its non-insurance
subsidiary in London known as AIG Financial Products (AIG-FP). Those swaps
had a functional resemblance to insurance because they promised protection in
the form of payments to the buyers based upon the occurrence of specified events
of default. Nevertheless, those swaps were exempt from insurance regulation (and
regulation of virtually any other type) and did not require an insurable interest.52
While AIG-FP stopped selling new CDS in 2005, it remained liable for over
half a trillion dollars in CDS protection at the end of 2007.53 Given the enormity
of that liability, AIG’s over-the-counter swaps presented systemic risk because a
default by a protection seller of that size could trigger a chain reaction of other
counterparty insolvencies and defaults.54
Unfortunately for AIG, it had managed its CDS obligations too cockily,
setting itself up for a fall. AIG-FP had seriously underestimated the chance that
the CDOs it had guaranteed would default and, consequently, had underpriced the
CDS protection it had sold.55 AIG also grossly misjudged two other risks: (1)
market risk, or the risk that AIG’s CDS might drop in value, forcing the firm to
take major write-downs and losses to capital; and (2) counterparty risk, or the risk
that AIG’s CDS buyers would demand more cash security than expected from
AIG to back its guarantees. The latter miscalculation proved ruinously costly
because the company had invested its proceeds from CDS in highly illiquid assets
that later proved tough to sell when the company needed to raise cash collateral
for the swaps.56
Initially, when AIG sold its swaps, it was able to do so with no reserves or
collateral because the company had a stellar AAA credit rating. Confident that

51. See FIO MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
52. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, Titles I–II, 114
Stat. 2763 (previously codified at scattered sections of 7 and 15 U.S.C.); N.Y. INS. L. § 6901(j-1)
(McKinney 2005); Letter from Rochelle Katz, Associate Att’y, State of N.Y. Ins. Dep’t, to Bertil
Lundqvist, Att’y, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP ( June 16, 2000) (on file with the N.Y.
Dept. of Ins. Gen. Counsel). For further discussion, see Hearing to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in
the U.S. Economy Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Eric Dinallo,
Superintendent, Insurance Department, State of New York); and ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 46, at
220–21.
53. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Aug. 6, 2008).
54. For a description of those runs, see ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 46, at 105–07, 221–23.
55. American International Group Investor Meeting—Final, FD (FAIR DISCLOSURE) WIRE, Dec. 5,
2007.
56.
Vikas Bajaj & Mark Landler, Mortgage Losses Echo in Europe and on Wall St., N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2007, at A1; Brady Dennis & Robert O’Harrow Jr., A Crack in the System, WASH. POST, Dec.
30, 2008, at A1; Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Biggest Insurer’s Crisis, a Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at A1.
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there would be no serious collateral calls,57 AIG’s CDS managers also failed to pay
attention to capital adequacy.58 As a result, AIG-FP only had about $2.1 billion in
capital in December 2007, and most of that capital was of dubious quality.
ii.

AIG’s Securities Lending Business

AIG’s CDS business was located outside of its insurance company
subsidiaries. However, that was not true for its securities lending service, which
was another systemically risky activity conducted by AIG. In that line of business,
AIG’s insurance subsidiaries lent their securities to short sellers in return for cash
collateral through a noninsurance affiliate named AIG Securities Lending
Corporation.59
Originally, state insurance regulators set conservative parameters on the
reinvestment of the cash collateral when they approved the practice because the
borrowers of AIG’s securities were entitled to return those securities and demand
back their cash at any time. However, in order to grow its securities lending
business, AIG started overstepping those limits by asking for less than full
collateral and reinvesting the cash collateral it received in illiquid residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).60 Those decisions came back to haunt AIG
after the credit rating agencies successively slashed the ratings on those RMBS as
the subprime crisis deepened in 2007 and 2008. When AIG’s securities lending
counterparties showed up to return their securities and demand their cash back,
AIG had increasing difficulty repaying them. The reason was that AIG could not
sell the RMBS in which it had invested the counterparties’ cash for anywhere near
full price.61 Compounding this problem, the average term of the RMBS that AIG
had invested in was substantially longer than the average length of AIG’s securities
loans, which ranged from overnight to sixty days.62 Because AIG’s insurance
subsidiaries were heavily involved in the group’s securities lending activities,63 they
were directly exposed to runs on cash as a result of those activities.

57. See Brady Dennis, The AIG E-mail Trail, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2009, at A1; Dennis &
O’Harrow, supra note 56; Jonathan D. Glater, With Shares Battered, A.I.G. Ousts Its Leader, N.Y. TIMES,
June 16, 2008, at C1; Morgenson, supra note 56; The Causes and Effects of the AIG Bailout: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Eric R. Dinallo, Former
Superintendent, New York State Insurance Department).
58. See Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., supra note 53, at 29–32.
59. See CONGR. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG RESCUE, ITS
IMPACT ON MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT’S EXIT STRATEGY 42–43 ( June 10, 2010)
[hereinafter CONGR. OVERSIGHT PANEL JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT]; Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra
note 49, at 1585.
60. See CONGR. OVERSIGHT PANEL JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 59, at 43–44, 47.
61. See, e.g., id., at 44–46; Spring Break: A Practice Which Underpins Swathes of the Financial System
Faces Turmoil, THE ECONOMIST (May 11, 2013) [hereinafter Spring Break].
62. See FIO MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.
63. See, e.g., CONGR. OVERSIGHT PANEL JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 59, at 46;
Spring Break, supra note 61; FIO MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 1, at 18–19.
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AIG’s Collapse and Federal Bailout

Things began to deteriorate in late 2007, when the credit rating agencies
issued a series of downgrades on AIG’s credit obligations, thereby depressing
AIG’s stock price and forcing AIG to post more collateral. As more downgrades
ensued, AIG had to write down its CDS portfolio and the company struggled to
meet mounting cash collateral calls to cover its CDS and securities lending
obligations.64
The time of reckoning came on Monday, September 15, 2008—the day that
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy—when Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s
cut AIG’s long-term rating three more notches. The downgrades meant that AIG
suddenly had to raise as much as $75 billion in cash to cover its credit default
swap obligations. Although the New York insurance commissioner had just given
AIG permission to pull $20 billion in cash out of its insurance subsidiaries in
exchange for illiquid assets worth the same amount, that was just a drop in the
bucket compared to the total $75 billion that was coming due. Without sufficient
time to raise the rest of the cash by dumping tens of billions of dollars in assets
into a falling market, AIG rapidly careened toward bankruptcy.65
Meanwhile, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy had sent global markets into a
panic and federal officials could not stomach a repeat of that fiasco.
Consequently, on Tuesday, September 16, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke grimly capitulated and agreed to an $85
billion federal bailout of AIG. To finance the rescue, the Federal Reserve opened
its discount window for the first time ever to an insurance company, citing the
“unusual and exigent circumstances” clause of former section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act.66
In exchange for that financial lifeline, the federal government took a
majority 79.9% equity stake in AIG.67 Once Uncle Sam became AIG’s controlling
shareholder, it pumped even more money into AIG in the form of more loans and
commercial paper support to salvage its investment. By the end of 2009, total
federal aid to AIG had ballooned to $182 billion.68 It was the biggest federal
financial bailout of all time.69
When Bernanke and Paulson forged the rescue package for AIG, their main
aim was to avert contagion. They were concerned about AIG’s commanding role
as the one of largest sellers of CDS protection on corporate bonds, mortgagebacked securities, and CDOs worldwide. AIG owed a total of $441 billion in swap
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See CONGR. OVERSIGHT PANEL JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 59, at 37–40.
See id. at 59–68.
See id. at 68–71; former 12 U.S.C. § 343(3).
See CONGR. OVERSIGHT PANEL JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 59, at 71.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-975, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM: STATUS OF GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO AIG (2009), http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d09975.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MYN-EG3B].
69. AIG eventually paid back the loans in full and the federal government sold its equity stake.
See Javier E. David, AIG Makes Final Repayment to Government for Bailout, CNBC (Mar. 1, 2013, 1:37
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100397698 [https://perma.cc/3CRU-58GU].
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obligations, including $20 billion to Goldman Sachs alone. If AIG had gone
bankrupt and defaulted on its swaps, investment banks and depository institutions
that had bought that swap protection immediately would have to take writedowns, eating into their already thin capital and forcing them to sell more stock
just when investors were fleeing equities.70
Bernanke and Paulson were also concerned about runs on other financial
institutions if AIG filed for bankruptcy. In a briefing to members of Congress on
the night of the bailout, both men warned that an AIG bankruptcy filing could
lead to a massive run on mutual funds because AIG was one of the ten biggest
stock holdings in 401(k) plans. Similarly, AIG’s debt would immediately go into
default if AIG went bankrupt, thereby exposing the numerous banks and mutual
funds that owned that debt to the risk of runs.71
On the surface, the AIG debacle did not appear to involve traditional
insurance. All of AIG-FP’s activities took place outside of AIG’s insurance
subsidiaries. Furthermore, all of AIG’s insurance operations remained solvent,
thanks to the vigilance of state insurance regulators.
Nevertheless, the risky securities lending activities of AIG’s insurers cast
doubt on that account. On closer examination, furthermore, the AIG episode
raised troubling questions about insurance regulation and its ability to oversee
complex, internationally-active insurance groups. In at least one respect, insurance
regulators had manufactured that problem themselves. In a classic case of
arbitrage, AIG’s decision to push its disastrous CDS activities into an unregulated
subsidiary was made possible, in part, by the decision by the New York
Superintendent of Insurance declining to define CDS as insurance in 2000.72 This
regulatory gap was not confined to the states: the federal government was
complicit as well, having made the rash decision in 2000 to exempt CDS from
federal regulation.73 The point is, however, that the state insurance authorities
passed up the opportunity to regulate a systemically risky product that easily could
have been defined as insurance. Had the states done so, all CDS would have had
to have an insurable interest, which would have eliminated trillions of dollars in
speculative bets on other entities’ investments in debt known as naked CDS.
Equally importantly, the AIG chapter shed light on the fact that no state
insurance regulator had the authority to oversee AIG’s holding company, AIGFP, or AIG Securities Lending Corporation to determine whether undue risk in
those operations threatened the insurance subsidiaries over which they did have
purview. Insurance regulation was siloed: state insurance regulators had
70. See CONGR. OVERSIGHT PANEL JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 59, at 69, 75,
130–33; Edmund L. Andrews et al., Fed in an $85 Billion Rescue of an Insurer Near Failure, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 2008, at A1; Morgenson, supra note 56, at 1.
71. Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Throwing a Lifeline to a Troubled Giant, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
17, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/business/18insure.html.
72. See Letter from Rochelle Katz to Bertil Lundqvist, supra note 52. See generally Arthur
Kimball-Stanley, Insurance and Credit Default Swaps: Should Like Things Be Treated Alike?, 15 CONN. INS.
L.J. 241, 247, 252 (2008).
73. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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preeminent oversight of AIG’s insurance subsidiaries but no real authority over its
noninsurance affiliates. Accordingly, they did not detect the illegal expansion of
AIG’s securities lending business and were clueless about AIG’s CDS activities.
Complicating the states’ lack of jurisdiction, AIG-FP was located in London,
which state commissioners were powerless to reach. As it happened, AIG did have
a consolidated federal supervisor by virtue of AIG’s ownership of an insured
savings and loan institution: the hapless former OTS. As events proved, OTS was
not up to the job74 and Congress eventually abolished the agency in the DoddFrank Act.75
Despite OTS’s miserable performance in supervising AIG, state insurance
regulators were no more capable of that task for different reasons. No state law
gave them jurisdiction to directly regulate the parent holding companies of
insurance groups. Similarly, insurance commissioners lacked authority to oversee
the noninsurance subsidiaries of insurance conglomerates, something that was
doubly a problem in the case of foreign subsidiaries.
This lack of state statutory authority had two important consequences. First,
to the extent that parent companies and noninsurance affiliates of insurance
companies posed systemic risk to the financial stability of the nation, only the
federal government could regulate that risk, not the states. And, second, the states’
lack of effective parent company oversight revealed the limits on the states’ own
ability to prevent excessive risk taking in other parts of complex insurance groups.
Without mandatory capital requirements for holding companies, state insurance
regulators could not ensure that those holding companies served as a source of
strength for their insurance subsidiaries.76 In the case of AIG, the CDS activities
of AIG-FP put crushing demands on AIG’s parent company for capital support,
thereby siphoning off capital that otherwise would have been available to backstop
the insurance operations. The availability of that parental support was crucial
because AIG’s insurance companies had suffered losses from their own risky
securities lending activities. To make matters worse, AIG’s holding company then
begged state insurance commissioners in September 2008 for permission to
upstream cash from the insurance subsidiaries to help AIG-FP to meet its collateral
calls. The New York insurance commissioner acceded to that pressure and agreed
to a $20 billion upstream commitment in exchange for illiquid assets of uncertain

74. For a full account of the myriad failings in OTS’s oversight of AIG and how it came to
acquire jurisdiction over AIG-FP despite AIG-FP’s location in the European Union, see ENGEL &
MCCOY, supra note 46, at 221–23.
75. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
313, 124 Stat. 1376, 1523 (2010).
76. This problem persists. The Financial Stability Board reported that “no action has been
taken” in the United States (outside of depository institution holding companies and insurance
company SIFIs) “to apply insurance capital requirements to the consolidated insurance group. This
means that no adjustments are made by states to address any intra-group creation of capital caused by
multiple gearing.” FIN. STABILITY BD., PEER REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES 37 (2013),
http://www. fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130827.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QLZ-ZZG5].
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value.77 In these ways, AIG’s noninsurance activities directly put policyholder
reserves at risk.
The bailout of AIG also unleashed the most potent rationale for federal
intervention of all because it marked the first time that the federal government
bore the negative externalities from an insurance group’s failure. Moreover, the
AIG debacle was no small event. To the contrary, AIG’s rescue was the largest
federal bailout of a private enterprise in U.S. history.78 The political outrage that
ensued matched the enormity of the rescue79 and reflected serious substantive
concerns. Moral hazard by industry was certain to result from the impression,
which the Federal Reserve’s actions confirmed, that AIG was too big to fail.
Similarly, the Federal Reserve suffered a serious blow to its legitimacy after
making its unprecedented decision to give AIG access to the discount window.
b.

TARP Payments to Other Insurance Companies

During the fall of 2008, AIG was not the only insurance company recipient
of the federal government’s largesse. Over $4 billion of Washington’s $700 billion
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) went to bail out two other troubled
insurers: The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., and Lincoln National
Corporation. The Allstate Corporation, Ameriprise Financial, Inc., Principal
Financial Group, and Prudential Financial, Inc. applied for and received
preliminary approval for TARP funds but eventually turned them down.80 Several
other insurance companies applied for TARP funds (including MetLife) but later
withdrew their applications or were denied.81
77. Events overtook this decision, however, and ultimately the $20 billion payment was never
made. See CONGR. OVERSIGHT PANEL JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 59, at 49–50.
78. See Michael Powell & Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G. Agrees to Pay $725 Million to Settle Fraud
Case in Ohio, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2010, at B1.
79. Public rage boiled over when the press reported in March 2009 that AIG had recently
awarded $165 million in bonuses to executives at AIG-FP, notwithstanding the bailout. See ENGEL &
MCCOY, supra note 46, at 141.
80. See Allstate Comments on U.S. Treasury Capital Purchase Program, BUSINESSWIRE (May 15,
2009, 11:02 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20090515005547/en/AllstateComments-U.S.-Treasury-Capital-Purchase-Program [https://perma.cc/W6UU-283J]; Arthur
D. Postal, Allstate Says Thanks, But No Thanks to Offer of Federal TARP Rescue Money,
PROPERTYCASUALTY360° (May 25, 2009), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2009/05/25/
allstate-says-thanks-but-no-thanks-to-offer-of-federal-tarp-rescue-money [https://perma.cc/9P55HRKX]; Press Release, Principal Fin. Grp., Principal Financial Group Declines Funding from U.S.
Treasury Capital Purchase Program ( June 11, 2009), http://investors.principal.com/investorrelations/news-releases/press-release-details/2009/Principal-Financial-Group-Declines-Fundingfrom-US-Treasury-Capital-Purchase-Program/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/2WC4-DCW9];
Press Release, Prudential Fin., Inc., Statement by Prudential Financial, Inc. ( June 1, 2009),
http://www.investor.prudential.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=129695&p=RssLanding&cat=news&id=
1294196 [https://perma.cc/YB3D-A32H].
81. Those insurance companies included Genworth Financial, MetLife, Protective Life Corp.,
and The Phoenix Companies. See Arthur D. Postal, Some Insurers Qualify for TARP, But ‘Nothing is
Imminent,’ LIFEHEALTHPRO (Apr. 20, 2009), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2009/04/20/someinsurers-qualify-for-tarp-but-nothing-is-immi (on file with the UC Irvine Law Review). Later, in its
decision designating MetLife as a systemically important insurer, the Financial Stability Oversight
Council recounted other ways in which MetLife had tapped the federal safety net during the financial
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The TARP rescues of The Hartford and Lincoln National shed light on
other insurance company activities that could spell systemic risk necessitating
bailouts. Both companies were life insurers that suffered sharp capital declines
after the market nosedive in the fall of 2008 saddled them with hefty investment
losses and multiplied their liabilities on guaranteed benefits under their variable
life insurance and annuity products.82 The TARP applications filed by these and
other insurance companies sensitized the Treasury Department to the
counterparty exposure and fragility of some life insurers to market volatility.
c.

Financial Guaranty Insurers

Financial guaranty insurers, another segment of the insurance industry, were
also hard hit but did not receive federal bailouts during the financial crisis. Those
insurers, also known as “bond insurers,” provide a layer of insurance against
default on bonds. Traditionally this insurance was limited to municipal bonds.
However, with the explosion of private-label mortgage securitization in the late
1990s, financial guaranty insurers began to sell insurance to investors against
defaults on RMBS and CDOs as well.83 In 2008, there were nine main U.S. bond
insurers and they guaranteed over $2 trillion in mortgage-related securities in the
years leading up to the crisis. During the housing bubble, the bond insurers also
issued CDS on RMBS and invested in RMBS and CDOs, including securities they
had guaranteed themselves.
In recognition of the potentially ruinous exposure posed by financial
guaranties, state insurance regulators traditionally limited financial guaranty
insurers to a monoline structure, which prohibited those companies from offering
other types of insurance.84 In other ways during the run-up to 2008, however,
state regulators were overly sanguine about the risks these companies were taking.
In particular, state regulators allowed the financial guaranty insurers to operate
with relatively little capital (in some cases zero) because of the historically low
default rates on municipal bonds and residential mortgages.85
This thin capital buffer left financial guaranty insurers ill-prepared for what
was to come. Starting in early 2007, financial guaranty insurers were hit with a
mounting number of claims as defaults spiked on home mortgages and RMBS and
crisis. During 2008 and 2009, for instance, MetLife’s bank received nineteen Term Auction Facility
loans totaling $18.9 billion through the Federal Reserve. In 2009, MetLife also obtained $397 million
through the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program offered by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. MetLife borrowed another $1.6 billion through the Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper
Funding Facility. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING METLIFE, INC. 14–15 (2014)
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/
[hereinafter
FSOC
METLIFE],
Documents/MetLife%20Public%20Basis.pdf [https://perma.cc/VCX7-6M7M].
82. See, e.g., The Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 22–24, 65, 67,
156–58, 165, 181–82, 191 (Feb. 22, 2008); Lincoln Nat’l Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 49–50
(Feb. 27, 2009).
83. See, e.g., FIO MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 1, at 19–20, 30.
84. See, e.g., id. at 30.
85. See, e.g., id. at 29–30.
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CDOs.86 By 2008, bond insurers were reeling from losses. This is apparent from
the sharp increase in the industry’s combined ratios from 2006 to 2008. The
combined ratio is the percentage of premiums an insurer pays out in claims and
expenses. A ratio under 100% means profitability; a ratio over 100% raises
profitability concerns. In 2006, the financial guaranty insurance industry’s average
combined ratio was 10%. By 2008, the same ratio was 484%. Only one bond
insurer—Warren Buffett’s company, Berkshire Hathaway—had a combined ratio
of less than 100% at the end of 2008.
Soon the rating agencies responded with downgrades. By the end of 2008, all
of the U.S. bond insurers except Berkshire Hathaway had lost their AAA ratings
and Berkshire lost its later on. By May of 2012, eight of the nine bond insurers
were no longer writing new business and more than half had been seized or were
in runoff.87

Table 1: Bond Insurer Health as of May 2012
Bond Insurer
Berkshire Hathaway
Assured Guaranty
MBIA/National
Radian
Ambac

S&P Rating as of
May 2012
AA+
AABBB
B+
Not rated

Writing New Business?
No
Yes
No
In runoff
Seized by the State of
Wisconsin in 2010

86. For the same reason, the private mortgage insurance industry was buffeted with losses.
Private mortgage insurers guarantee repayment of individual home mortgages if the borrowers
default. Typically, these insurers focus on higher-risk mortgages (normally where the loan-to-value
ratio exceeds 80%). See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, MORTGAGE INSURANCE:
MARKET STRUCTURE, UNDERWRITING CYCLE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 2–3 (2013),
http://www.bis.org/publ/joint33.pdf [https://perma.cc/YHU2-YQJT]; FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 34 (2013),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/
FIO%20Annual%20Report%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9QX-9U5H].
87 See infra Table 1.
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ACA
FGIC

Not rated
Not rated
Not rated

CFIG

Not rated
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In runoff
In runoff
Seized by New York State
in 2011
In runoff

These credit rating downgrades were disastrous to the financial guaranty
industry’s viability. In the structured finance business, the bond insurers were
essentially lending out their AAA credit ratings to issuers for a fee. Consequently,
their financial survival hinged on their AAA ratings. If the insurers’ credit ratings
dropped below AAA, it would harm their ability to write new business and bring
in new premiums.
That’s exactly what happened. By 2011, the market for insured municipal
bonds shrank from 50% of new issues precrisis to only 5%. The contraction of
this market made it temporarily difficult for some municipalities to raise money by
selling bonds.88 Meanwhile, the private-label market for structured-mortgage
finance collapsed and has not come back in any significant way. As of 2013, only
two U.S. bond insurers—Assured Guaranty and a new entrant, Build America—
were actively providing financial guarantees.89 While some observers express
optimism about the industry,90 its near-term future prospects remain uncertain.
The events of 2008 showed how financial guaranty insurance could spawn
systemic risk in multiple ways. First, the downgrades of the bond insurers led to
downgrades on the securities they guaranteed. This affected both mortgage-related
securities and municipal bonds. Institutional investors such as commercial banks
and insurance companies that were limited by law to owning investment-grade
holdings often had to sell bonds that had been downgraded to junk, which put
downward pressure on prices. Similarly, financial institutions that bought swap
protection from the bond insurers had to mark those swaps to market, sustaining
losses and eroding their capital. Making matters worse, some bond insurers and
private mortgage insurers refused to pay claims, sometimes because regulators
ordered them not to make payments.
Financial guaranty insurance was just one of the sources of systemic risk in
the insurance sector. AIG’s CDS activities and securities lending by its insurance
company subsidiaries both proved vulnerable to runs. In the life insurance sector,
costly guaranteed minimum benefits on variable life and annuity products caused
some of the nation’s largest life insurers to ask for federal lifelines. Meanwhile, the

88. See, e.g., FIO MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.
89. See FED. INS. OFFICE, supra note 86, at 35; Jeffrey Stern, Do Capital Markets Need Financial
Guaranty Insurers?, LAW360 (Oct. 6, 2014, 10:49 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/582781/docapital-markets-need-financial-guaranty-insurers [https://perma.cc/Q5LR-Q2XX].
90. See Monolines Can Add Value Even with ‘A’ Category Ratings, FITCH RATINGS (Aug. 15, 2014,
8:36 AM) https://www.fitchratings.com/gws/en/fitchwire/fitchwirearticle/Monolines-Can-Add?
pr_id=852074 [https://perma.cc/9ZMH-NGH9]; Stern, supra note 89.
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bond insurance industry was virtually wiped out in 2008 and remains on life
support. Together these events fueled calls to regulate insurance for systemic risk.
2.

The Federal and International Policy Response

In the aftermath of 2008, the U.S. government, in tandem with global
regulators, moved aggressively to erect a new, overarching system for the
regulation of systemic risk. The U.S. system was federal in nature, which meant
that any financial institution posing systemic risk faced the prospect of federal
oversight. The urgent need for systemic risk regulation and the surprising new
concerns about systemic risk in insurance that 2008 unearthed opened the door to
a major new federal presence in insurance regulation. Meanwhile, international
bodies leaned on the United States to bolster its systemic risk oversight, which
further strengthened the federal government’s hand in intervening in insurance
regulation.
a.

The Dodd-Frank Act

Although the federal government had tinkered with systemic risk on a hit-ormiss basis before 2008, the manifest deficiencies in that oversight compelled
Congress to mandate a formal and elaborate federal system for systemic risk
regulation in the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. This system contemplated both the
supervision of individual, systemically risky financial institutions and of
systemically risky activities more generally. In addition, Dodd-Frank established
the new FIO as a beachhead for the new federal role in insurance.
i.

Federal Regulation of Systemically Important Insurers

AIG’s near demise and its unprecedented federal bailout impelled Congress
to enact several provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act to address systemic risk
emanating from the insurance sector. Front and center, Congress was distressed
that no one regulator—state or federal—had exercised any effective consolidated
oversight of AIG for systemic risk. Similarly, Congress was concerned about the
lack of any special resolution facility for failing, systemically risky nonbank firms
that were akin to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) resolution
procedures long used for failing banks.91
In response to these and similar concerns, Congress created a new
framework for federal oversight of systemic risk in Dodd-Frank. The linchpin of
that framework was the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC) in Title I.92 Among other things, Congress charged FSOC with deciding
91. In contrast to depository institutions, federal regulators had no good process for putting
AIG into an orderly federal receivership. At the time, the federal government could not locate a buyer
for the company and so its only options were to put AIG into bankruptcy or to grant a government
bailout. Fresh off the tumultuous Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the Federal Reserve was
understandably anxious about an AIG bankruptcy and chose the safer route. As a result, the federal
government came to control the world’s largest insurance company overnight.
92. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
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whether to designate particular nonbank financial services providers, including
insurers, as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) for purposes of
added federal regulation.93 To carry out that oversight, Congress authorized the
Federal Reserve Board to supervise and regulate all SIFIs, including bank and
nonbank SIFIs alike, using enhanced prudential standards.94 In addition, in Title II
of the 2010 legislation, Congress authorized the federal government to place
failing financial institutions, including insurers, into federal receivership in the
unusual circumstance where their failure and resolution under otherwise applicable
state or federal laws would have serious adverse effects on the financial stability of
the United States.95
To date, FSOC has designated three large insurance enterprises—AIG,
Prudential, and MetLife—as nonbank SIFIs.96 These insurance company SIFIs are
subject to examination by the Federal Reserve Board. In addition, they face
enhanced federal prudential standards including group-wide minimum leverage
and risk-based capital requirements,97 liquidity requirements, risk-management
requirements, resolution-plan and credit-exposure report requirements,
concentration limits, a contingent-capital requirement, enhanced public
disclosures, short-term debt limits, and other prudential standards instituted by the

111, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392–94 (2010).
93. Id. § 113(a). Nine of FSOC’s ten voting members are federal regulators outside of the
insurance area. The tenth is an independent member with insurance expertise who is appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate for a six-year term. In addition, two of FSOC’s five nonvoting
members are from the insurance sector: the Director of the Federal Insurance Office and a state
insurance commissioner, chosen by his or her peers. Id. § 111(b)–(c).
94. Id. §§ 114, 115(a)(1), (c), 117(a)–(b), 161(a)–(c), 162(a)–(b), 165. Under Dodd-Frank,
TARP recipients that were bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or
more on January 2, 2010, but that later ceased to be bank holding companies, are also subject to
enhanced standards and supervision. Id. § 117.
95. Id. § 203(c)(4).
96. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL
GROUP, INC. (2013) [hereinafter FSOC AIG], https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/
designations/Documents/Basis%20of%20Final%20Determination%20Regarding%20American%
20International%20Group,%20Inc.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MPJ-C86F]; FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S FINAL DETERMINATION
REGARDING PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC. (2013) [hereinafter FSOC PRUDENTIAL], https://
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Prudential%20Financial%20Inc.pdf
[
https://perma.cc/BAG5-2UQ7]; FSOC METLIFE, supra note 81. In January 2015, MetLife appealed
its SIFI designation to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. See MetLife, Inc. v. Fin.
Stability Oversight Council, No. 15-45 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 13, 2015). On March 30, 2016, as this
Article was going to press, the court ruled in favor of MetLife and rescinded its SIFI designation.
Order, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, No. 15-0045 (RMC) (D.D.C. filed Mar. 30,
2016).
97. In December 2014, Congress passed an amendment to Dodd-Frank clarifying that the
Federal Reserve Board shall not be required to include insurance subsidiaries when establishing the
minimum leverage and risk-based capital requirements on a consolidated basis for depository
institution holding companies and nonbank SIFIs. Nothing in the amendment, however, prohibits the
Board from establishing capital requirements at the group level. See Insurance Capital Standards
Clarification Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-279, § 2(2), 128 Stat. 3017 (2014) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5371(c)(1)–(c)(2)).
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Federal Reserve Board.98
ii.

The Creation of the Federal Insurance Office

Congress did not stop with the designation and federal supervision of
systemically risky insurers in the Dodd-Frank Act. It also mandated the creation of
the new FIO located within the U.S. Department of the Treasury in Title V of
Dodd-Frank.99 For the most part, however, FIO’s authority is truncated, and it
does not displace the traditional supervisory and regulatory role of the states over
insurance.
In lieu of having regulatory responsibilities, FIO’s jurisdiction is mostly
restricted to monitoring the insurance industry (including for access to insurance
and for regulatory gaps that could contribute to systemic risk), recommending
nonbank SIFI designations for individual insurers, assisting the Secretary of the
Treasury in administering the Terrorism Insurance Program under the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002, and consulting with the states on insurance matters of
national and international importance.100 Where FIO has teeth is in its power to
develop federal policy on the prudential aspects of international insurance issues
and to assist the Secretary in negotiating international treaties and other
agreements regarding the prudential regulation of the business of insurance or
reinsurance. As part of that authority, FIO represents the United States in the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and can issue
determinations that provisions of federal treaties preempt state insurance law.101
FIO also plays a formal role in the designation and federal oversight of
nonbank SIFIs under Titles I and II. The Director of FIO is a nonvoting member
of FSOC for purposes of FSOC decisions on designations and oversight.102
Furthermore, the Director must give approval, along with two-thirds of the
Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, before the Secretary of the Treasury
may seek to appoint the FDIC as the federal receiver of an insurance company on
grounds of systemic risk.103
The creation of FIO and FSOC and the Federal Reserve’s new role in
insurance have significance beyond these entities’ formal duties. Before these
events, the federal government had virtually no expertise in insurance. Now,
however, the federal government has a growing number of professionals spread
across the Treasury Department and the Board who have serious expertise in
insurance. Many of them are already deeply immersed in regulating some insurers.
Their presence provides a small but meaningful pad from which federal insurance
regulation could be launched. Furthermore, they have a growing stake in
98. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
165(b)(1)(A)–(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1424 (2010).
99. Id. § 502.
100. Id. § 502(a)(3).
101. Id. § 502(a)(3).
102. Id. § 111(b)(2).
103. Id. § 203(a)(1)(C).
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expanding federal insurance regulation because doing so will enhance their
responsibilities and reputations.104
iii.

Across-the-Board Supervision of Systemically Risky Activities

Often the preoccupation with SIFI designations gives the false impression
that systemic risk regulation outside of commercial banking is limited to the
oversight of SIFIs. The federal government, however, also has broad authority to
issue industry-wide regulations for financial activities posing systemic risk. This
type of regulation allows regulators to address systemic risk emanating from the
activities of numerous interconnected market actors, large and small.
There are growing instances of across-the-board systemic risk regulation.
The Dodd-Frank Act mandated extensive new regulation of derivatives trading.
Standardized derivatives must now be cleared and executed through central
clearinghouses to improve transparency and limit counterparty risk.105 DoddFrank also imposed margin requirements on CDS to reduce the risk to
counterparties and to tamp down leverage.106 Swap dealers and major swap
participants are subject to new minimum capital requirements to safeguard against
insolvency.107 Finally, Dodd-Frank authorized the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to institute
new data reporting and recordkeeping requirements for derivatives.108
Naturally, the asset-backed securitization industry was another target of
reform in Dodd-Frank. Dodd-Frank imposed new requirements on that industry
regarding conflicts of interest, mandatory disclosures, representations and
warranties by issuers, asset review and evaluation obligations, and the retention of
risk by securitizers to ensure109 that they have “skin in the game.”
Other reforms address capital markets trading and investment fund activities.
Under the Volcker Rule, Dodd-Frank restricted proprietary trading by bank
holding companies.110 For the first time ever, investment advisers to hedge funds
and private equity funds must register with SEC.111 In addition, private fund
advisers must make periodic filings with the Commission on topics such as assets
under management, use of leverage, counterparty credit risk exposure, and trading
practices.112 In 2014, the SEC adopted further reforms to reduce the risk of runs
104. I am grateful to Dan Schwarcz for these insights.
105. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§
723, 763(a), (c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1675, 1762–64 (2010).
106. Id. §§ 731, 764(a).
107. Id. §§ 731, 763(a).
108. Id. §§ 728, 763(i).
109. Id. §§ 621, 941–945.
110. Id. § 619.
111. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76 Fed. Reg.
42,950 ( July 19, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279); Exemptions for Advisers to Venture
Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers With Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management,
and Foreign Private Advisers, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,646, 39,680 ( July 6, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
275).
112. Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool
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on money market funds in response to pressure from FSOC.113
More such regulations can be expected down the road. In fall 2014, the SEC
announced plans to expand mandatory reporting by investment funds to include
data on separate accounts, their holdings of derivatives, the liquidity and valuation
of their assets, and their securities lending activities.114 The SEC also said it
planned to review options for improving fund liquidity and for limiting the use of
derivatives by retail mutual funds to boost returns through leverage.115 The
Commission moreover trained attention on a living will requirement for
investment advisers and funds and on stress tests to evaluate the ability of funds
to meet spikes in redemptions following economic shocks.116 The Commission
announced these plans after FSOC changed its focus in July of that year from
designating large asset managers as nonbank SIFIs to regulating potentially risky
activities in the investment-fund and asset-management industries.117
All of these systemic risk initiatives occurred against a backdrop of parallel
initiatives by international financial regulatory bodies. In the process, U.S. reforms
came under global scrutiny, increasing the pressure for an even stronger federal
presence in insurance regulation.
b.

International Response

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the G20 leaders asked the Financial
Stability Board (the FSB) to address the systemic risk presented by global SIFIs
(G-SIFIs). The FSB responded by publishing a systemic risk policy framework and
designating a number of large banking groups as global systemically important

Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. 71128 (Nov. 16, 2011)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 4, 275, 279).
113. Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47735 (Aug. 14,
2014) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, 274, 279).
114. See Andrew Ackerman, SEC Preps Mutual Fund Rules: Agency Eyes Greater Disclosure of
Portfolio Data, Stress Tests for Asset Managers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2014, at A1; Mary Jo White, Sec. &
Exchange Comm’n Chair, Enhancing Risk Monitoring and Regulatory Safeguards for the Asset
Management Industry, Address Before the New York Times DealBook Opportunities for Tomorrow
Conference (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543677722#.
VPTpfFptmbA [https://perma.cc/WJZ9-7MTX]. The SEC issued the proposed rule in June 2015.
Investment Company Reporting Modernization, 80 Fed. Reg. 33590 ( June 12, 2015).
115. See Ackerman, supra note 114, at A2; White, supra note 114, at 4. The SEC issued
proposed rule on both topics in fall 2015. Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment Companies
and Business Development Companies, 80 Fed. Reg. 80884 (Dec. 28, 2015); Open-End Fund
Liquidity Risk Management Programs; Swing Pricing; Re-Opening of Comment Period for
Investment Company Reporting Modernization Release, 80 Fed. Reg. 62274 (Oct. 15, 2015).
116. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 165(i)(2), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i)(2) (2012)); Use of Derivatives by
Registered Investment Companies and Business Development Companies, 80 Fed. Reg. 80884 (Dec.
28, 2015) (soliciting comment on a stress test requirement); Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk
Management Programs; Swing Pricing; Re-Opening of Comment Period for Investment Company
Reporting Modernization Release, 80 Fed. Reg. 62274 (Oct. 15, 2015) (discussing the appropriateness
of a stress test requirement; Ackerman, supra note 114, at A2; White, supra note 114, at 5.
117. See Ackerman, supra note 114, at A2.
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banks in November 2011.118 Meanwhile, the FSB delegated the tasks of
developing systemic risk policies for insurers and identifying global systemically
important insurers (G-SIIs) to the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors (IAIS).119
The IAIS identified nine initial G-SIIs in July 2013. The three U.S. insurers
on that list were AIG, MetLife, and Prudential.120 That same month, the IAIS
unveiled its policy framework for G-SIIs.121 Among the framework’s prescriptions
were heightened supervision, orderly resolution facilities, backstop capital
requirements, and higher loss absorption capacity for nontraditional insurance and
noninsurance activities.122
The IAIS’s recommendations for enhanced supervision were not just limited
to G-SIIs. In addition, the IAIS promulgated its Common Framework for the
Supervision of Internationally Active Insurance Groups (nicknamed ComFrame) to
foster global convergence in the oversight of internationally active insurance
conglomerates, regardless of whether they are designated as G-SIIs.123
Meanwhile, in 2013, the FSB completed a peer review of insurance
regulation in the United States that criticized state-based regulation and
recommended scrapping it in favor of federal regulation.124 According to the FSB,
“[g]iven the drawbacks of the current regulatory set-up, the US authorities should
carefully consider and provide recommendations to Congress as to whether
migration towards a more federal and streamlined structure may be a more
effective means of achieving greater regulatory uniformity.”125 In addition, the
FSB was sharply critical of the states’ inadequacies in consolidated oversight of
insurance groups and in capital adequacy regulation of insurance groups.126
These steps by the FSB and the IAIS exerted pressure to deepen federal
involvement in insurance regulation in a number of ways. The IAIS’s decision to
designate AIG, MetLife, and Prudential as G-SIIs undoubtedly played a part in the
companies’ U.S. SIFI designations. Global regulators’ emphasis on effective group
supervision further underscored the holes in the U.S. approach to that issue.
Meanwhile, the FSB’s push for international harmonization of capital adequacy
standards for internationally active insurers could well set a standard that would
ripple throughout the insurance industry.
118. Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., Global Systemically Important Insurers (G-SIIs) and the
Policy Measures That Will Apply to Them ( July 18, 2013), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
wp-content/uploads/r_130718.pdf [https://perma.cc/8T2M-RN9D].
119. Id. at 1.
120. Id. at 1, 4, Annex 1. These G-SIIs were identified using the methodology announced in
INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT INSURERS: INITIAL
ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY (2013), http://iaisweb.org/index.cfm?event=openFile&nodeId=
34257 [https://perma.cc/UCV3-ARY4].
121. INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, supra note 120.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 76, at 37.
125. See id. at 10.
126. See id.
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III. WHY FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN INSURANCE IS LIKELY TO GROW IN
FUTURE YEARS
Before 2008, the insurance industry and state insurance regulators succeeded
in staving off unwanted federal regulation of private insurance (apart from health
insurance, employee benefits, and certain types of catastrophe insurance) partly
because the federal government had not been tapped to bail out the insurance
sector. That all changed in 2008. That fall, in a stark departure from the past, the
federal government had to bear part of the negative externalities resulting from
systemic risk associated with the insurance sector, most notably in the bailout of
AIG and the TARP payments to The Hartford and Lincoln National.
History sheds light on the watershed significance of crossing that line. In a
related context before 1989, state bank and thrift regulators had significantly
broader authority and discretion in regulating federally insured depository
institutions than they do today. But during the savings-and-loan crisis in the 1980s,
some state regulators relaxed their prudential safeguards against lax lending and
equity investments to such an extreme that over two thousand thrifts and banks
failed.127 Despite the large number of depository institution failures during that
period, only a “relatively ‘small’ number of failures” were needed to “cause serious
strains on the [federal] deposit insurance fund.”128 The losses were so enormous
that the federal savings-and-loan deposit insurance fund failed and the federal
deposit insurance fund for banks went into the red, forcing Congress to
recapitalize both funds at taxpayer expense.129 In response to this abdication by
the states, Congress stripped the states of the power to set minimum prudential
standards for banks and thrifts in 1989 and 1991 and consolidated that authority
in the federal government.130
Similar to the events in banking, the federal bailouts to the insurance
industry in 2008 inexorably changed the terms of the debate over federal
intervention in insurance. The question is not whether the federal government will
intervene in insurance; rather, it is to what extent and how. Meanwhile, the recent
financial crisis, the enactment of Dodd-Frank, the creation of FSOC and FIO,
and the insurance initiatives of their international regulatory counterparts ignited a
new and more expansive discussion about the meaning of the term “systemic risk”
and the regulatory consequences flowing from that meaning. As I will discuss in
127. See I FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES: LESSONS FOR THE
FUTURE 3 fig.1.1 (1997), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/3_85.pdf; id. at 107–09,
122–26, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/87_136.pdf; id. at 168–69 & tbl.4.2, 176–86,
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/167_188.pdf.
128. See id. at 16.
129. See id. passim.
130. See id. at 100–05. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act
(FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (1989 legislation); Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (1991 legislation).
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the pages to come, the debate over federal regulation of insurance is playing out
against the background of the larger debate over the definition of “systemic risk.”
A. Term Mismatch and Runs
In its broadest sense, “systemic risk” is the risk that an entire system will
experience a series of correlated breakdowns. Historically, systemic risk most
often has been conceptualized as the problem of directly linked failures. Under
that theory, one financial actor’s inability to meet its obligations can directly inflict
severe losses on its creditors, which can cause them to default on their own
obligations and set off a chain reaction that topples other creditors down the line.
This could be set in motion by one large shock to a financial sector or the
economy or, less often, by a more limited shock to one institution that destabilizes
its counterparties. The lower a financial firm’s capital or the higher its
indebtedness or leverage, the more vulnerable it will be to systemic risk.
Alternatively, systemic risk may arise where the failure of one financial firm causes
creditors or investors to question the solvency of similar firms and withdraw their
funds.131
These scenarios share one thing in common, which is a balance sheet
featuring a maturity mismatch between short-term liabilities and long-term assets
that makes a financial firm susceptible to runs. The classic example involves a
bank run in which a bank, faced with a stampede by depositors to withdraw their
demand deposits, becomes insolvent because it cannot liquidate its long-term
assets at fair market value fast enough to pay off its depositors in full. If the bank’s
distress spreads to other banks—because depositors elsewhere start to worry that
their own banks are insolvent, because those banks are creditors of the original
bank that failed, or for some other reason—then the bank run may ripen into
systemic risk.132
Conventionally, the insurance industry has not been considered vulnerable to
runs because of differences in its balance sheet makeup and especially the maturity
of its liabilities.133 The classic model of insurance is premised on the law of large
numbers, in which a large number of uncorrelated risks are distributed along a
normal curve. Policyholders usually cannot demand a payout unless and until an
insured event occurs. For both reasons, insurance claims should be spaced out

131. See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Contagion, 108 J. POL. ECON. 1, 1 (2000);
Xavier Freixas et al., Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank, 32 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 611 (2000); George G. Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott, What Is Systemic
Risk, and Do Bank Regulators Retard or Contribute to It?, 7 INDEP. REV. 371, 371–73, 376, 379–80 (2003);
see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008).
132. See, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983); Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, Financial Intermediation 63
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8928, 2002) (“These definitions have in
common the feature that a panic is a systemic event in which consumers want to hold currency in
exchange for their demand deposits.”). See generally Gorton & Winton, supra, at 63–68.
133. For an examination of this argument, see Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 1634–
35.

2015]

SYSTEMIC RISK OVERSIGHT

1419

over a relatively long period of time, which lengthens the average maturity of an
insurance company’s liabilities to its policyholders. Ideally, that allows an insurer
to match its liabilities to the longer-term maturities of its assets. Consequently,
insurers are less likely than commercial banks to experience a surge in cash
redemptions that would threaten their liquidity and require them to liquidate their
assets for less than fair market value.134 Similarly, traditionally insurers were not
highly leveraged because they did not rely heavily on financing through debt or
substitutes for debt such as derivatives, repurchase agreements (repos), or
securities lending.
While this traditional model of insurance often holds true, recent experience
has shown that the insurance industry is not completely immune from runs. As
the financial crisis revealed, there are pockets of activities in some insurance
companies and groups that increase their leverage and expose those firms (or their
counterparties) to runs. FSOC relied heavily on these areas of concern in
designating insurance companies as SIFIs to date.
1.

Term Mismatch in Shadow Banking

The events of 2008 showed that bank deposits were not the only type of
short-term liabilities that were subject to runs. As the post-mortem demonstrated,
modern finance had spawned a “shadow-banking system” of other forms of
short-term debt financing that were also vulnerable to runs. For example, all of
the top U.S. investment banks in 2008 depended on short-term (often overnight)
lines of credit in the form of repo lending for funding.135 Bear Stearns and
Lehman Brothers cratered when their repo lenders refused to renew their
overnight loans. Similarly, in the over-the-counter derivatives market, panic about
AIG’s ability to meet its credit swap protection obligations led to cash margin calls
of crushing proportions. Money market funds also experienced runs, one of which
capsized the Reserve Primary Fund in September 2008.136
These types of runs can spread systemic risk through one and sometimes
two pathways. The first pathway involves counterparty exposures. If a megafirm
reneges on its short-term liabilities, this can bring down the creditors who are
owed that money, which in turn could topple their creditors.137 Generally, this
134. See INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, supra note 120.
135. A repurchase or repo agreement is a functional substitute for a loan in which the
financial institution seeking to borrow sells securities for cash pursuant to an agreement to buy back
the securities at a set price at a later date. See TOBIAS ADRIAN ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.,
REPO AND SECURITIES LENDING 2–3 (2013), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/
sr529.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU5B-EXA4].
136. Diana B. Henriques, Money Market Fund Warns Its Customers Face Losses, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 2008, at C1; Lawrence Schmidt et al., Runs on Money Market Mutual Funds (Working Paper 2014),
http://rady.ucsd.edu/docs/faculty/timmermann-money-market-funds.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ7W44GV].
137. According to Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi, highly interconnected financial
systems are safer so long as the size and number of damaging shocks remain small. As shocks increase
in quantity and size, however, financial systems with a high degree of interconnectedness among large
counterparties become increasingly fragile. Daron Acemoglu et al., Systemic Risk and Stability in
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concern about a cascading effect is limited to situations where a company’s
counterparties are other SIFIs and not retail customers. In contrast, the second
pathway—where mass liquidation of assets in order to meet redemptions sends
market prices into a tailspin138—can harm large financial institutions and retail
customers alike.
a.

Term-Mismatch Problems in the Insurance Industry

As the events of 2008 showed, runs were not limited to investment banks,
money market funds, or derivatives issuers. Closer analysis revealed a number of
term-mismatch problems in corners of the insurance industry, creating the
potential for runs. FSOC cited several such problems in its decisions to designate
AIG, Prudential, and MetLife as SIFIs.
Specifically, FSOC expressed concern about various funding streams that
increased the leverage of all three insurance SIFIs and their vulnerability to runs
due to term mismatches. For example, the Council pointed to AIG’s, Prudential’s,
and MetLife’s securities lending businesses as one worrisome area of counterparty
exposures and asset liquidation.139 Repo financing at all three insurers posed
similar concerns.140 In addition, the Council singled out the three companies’
derivatives holdings, which could “require [them] to either post additional
collateral or to raise cash to close out certain funding transactions.”141 These
activities presented term-mismatch problems to the extent that AIG, Prudential,
or MetLife could be forced to dump substantial amounts of long-term or illiquid
investments142 in order to raise cash to meet collateral calls or repayment demands
on short-term repo loans, securities loans, or derivatives obligations.
In its MetLife decision, FSOC also flagged a new area of concern, involving
term-mismatch problems with MetLife’s funding agreement-backed notes
(FABNs) and related products. FABNs are financing instruments in which
investors buy notes from a special purpose vehicle (SPV) organized by a sponsor
Financial Networks (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18727, 2013), http://www.
nber.org/papers/w18727.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XD5-5WDC].
138. Acharya theorizes systemic runs as “the joint failure risk arising from the correlation of
returns on [the] asset side of” financial firm balance sheets. Viral V. Acharya, A Theory of Systemic Risk
and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation, 5 J. FIN. STABILITY 224, 225 (2009).
139. See FSOC PRUDENTIAL, supra note 96, at 2; FSOC AIG, supra note 96, at 3, 14; FSOC
METLIFE, supra note 81, at 10–11, 17, 19; VIEWS OF THE COUNCIL’S INDEPENDENT MEMBER
HAVING INSURANCE EXPERTISE 3, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/
Documents/Dissenting%20and%20Minority%20Views.pdf [https://perma.cc/UU73-ERRP].
140. See FSOC PRUDENTIAL, supra note 96, at 8; FSOC AIG, supra note 96, at 3, 7, 14; FSOC
METLIFE, supra note 81, at 19, 21–22; VIEWS OF THE COUNCIL’S INDEPENDENT MEMBER HAVING
INSURANCE EXPERTISE, supra note 139, at 3.
141. See FSOC AIG, supra note 96, at 3, 11–13; FSOC PRUDENTIAL, supra note 96, at 3;
FSOC METLIFE, supra note 81, at 18–19, 29. In MetLife, the Council further stated that the company’s
hedging activities through derivatives increased its “complexity and interconnectedness with other
financial markets participants.” FSOC METLIFE, supra note 81, at 9.
142. For example, in the MetLife decision, FSOC stressed the company’s substantial holdings
of relatively illiquid assets, including U.S. corporate fixed-income securities and U.S. asset-backed
securities. See FSOC METLIFE, supra note 81, at 24.
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such as MetLife. In MetLife’s case, those notes are backed by an underlying
agreement by MetLife to pay interest and principal on amounts that it borrows
from the SPV. Some of these FABNs were short term, which could create
liquidity problems for MetLife if the holders of those notes decided not to renew
their investments.143 In its designation opinion, FSOC pointed out that MetLife
had one of the highest leverage ratios among its peers, due in part to its reliance
on FABNs.144 FSOC was also worried that up to sixty-five money market mutual
funds could “break the buck” if MetLife defaulted on its funding agreementbacked securities owned by those funds, thereby triggering a run on other money
market funds.145
FSOC also discerned the potential for runs in the redemption rights issued
by all three companies on some of their traditional life insurance products. These
insurers issued large amounts of life insurance products (including variable
annuities) that guaranteed cash redemptions to policyholders who surrendered
those policies or took out loans.146 Similarly, MetLife’s guaranteed investment
contracts (GICs) gave customers a unilateral right of withdrawal for purposes of
loans, benefits, or transfers to other funds within a plan.147 Three types of
contagion might ensue in the case of a surge in redemptions, according to FSOC.
First, if large financial intermediaries and other companies had significant
exposure to institutional products of that nature, they could face counterparty risk
or would need to write down those assets from book value to market value if the
insurer encountered material financial distress. Second, a decision by such a large
insurer to sell illiquid assets at fire-sale prices in order to meet redemptions could
disrupt the broader financial markets. Lastly, if policyholders at other companies
lost confidence in the solvency of their life insurers, that could lead to an uptick in
early withdrawals at those companies as well.148 Given MetLife’s position as the
largest publicly traded U.S. insurance organization and the largest provider of life
insurance in the United States, combined with the size of its customer base, which

143. See id. at 9–10, 21.
144. The Council also pointed to MetLife’s outstanding long-term debt, junior subordinated
debt, unsecured credit and committed facilities, and Federal Home Loan Bank financing as sources of
its leverage. See id. at 9, 16, 18–19, 24.
145. See id. at 19.
146. See FSOC AIG, supra note 96, at 2; FSOC PRUDENTIAL, supra note 96, at 2, 8; FSOC
METLIFE, supra note 81, at 13–14, 20–23. MetLife also issued other types of guarantees on many of
its life insurance and annuity products, including minimum interest rate, minimum living benefit, and
minimum death benefit features. If MetLife could not honor those guarantees due to financial
distress, the affected policyholders could suffer losses. FSOC METLIFE, supra note 81, at 11, 17; see
also Elia Berdin & Matteo Sottocornola, Insurance Activities and Systemic Risk 19–20 (ICIR Working
Paper Series 19/15 2015) (concluding that life insurers make a relatively bigger contribution to
systemic risk in part because the “life business entails certain financial characteristics, such as
investment protections, return guarantees and so on, which make the provider more systemically
relevant compared to insurers which focus more on underwriting risk, such as [the] property and
casualty business”).
147. See FSOC METLIFE, supra note 81, at 12, 18.
148. See FSOC AIG, supra note 96, at 2–3, 6–7; FSOC PRUDENTIAL, supra note 96, at 2–3;
FSOC METLIFE, supra note 81, at 21–25.
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was 100 million strong worldwide, FSOC expressed further concerns about the
widespread effect of any losses on MetLife’s retail policyholders and customers if
MetLife defaulted on the guaranteed features.149
In voicing this latter concern, however, the Council did not explain how
these losses could activate a recession or systemic risk. Similarly, while FSOC
expressed concern about features of AIG’s annuity products that “could make
them vulnerable to rapid and early withdrawals by policyholders,”150 it did not
describe those features in any detail or quantify the magnitude of those contracts.
b.

Implications for Future Federal Oversight of Insurance

FSOC’s focus on term-mismatch problems in insurance groups has several
possible implications for the future direction of federal insurance regulation.
These implications include heightened federal scrutiny of leverage and potential
runs in insurance, greater federal oversight of insurance groups more generally,
and across-the-board regulation of insurers, no matter their size, who engage in
systemically risky activities.
i.

Federal Focus on Leverage and Potential for Runs

First, the SIFI deliberations showed that some large insurers are more reliant
on short-term debt than was commonly understood. To the extent that insurance
companies—especially large insurance companies—rely on short-term debt for
part of their financing, FSOC will pay attention. Since most insurance companies’
liabilities are financed by premiums and thus are heavily weighted toward longterm obligations to policyholders, reliance on short-term debt by insurers is
relatively rare but not unknown.
There is one instance in which insurance policies can have demand-like
features and that is with certain life insurance and annuity policies that are subject
to early withdrawal at the initiative of the policyholder. As a general rule, life
insurers reserve the right to suspend these sorts of redemptions. Nevertheless,
they will be hesitant to invoke that right lest it suggest the appearance of
insolvency.151 Given FSOC’s concern about the propensity of these types of life
insurance and annuity policies to runs in the form of spikes in redemptions, it
comes as no surprise that the first three U.S. insurance SIFI designees were giants
in the life insurance industry.
These cash-redemption features are unique to the life insurance industry, but
other term-mismatch problems flagged by FSOC involve financial activities
engaged in by insurance companies more generally. Securities lending and
derivatives trading are the most obvious examples; sponsorship of investment
funds (including money market funds and mutual funds) is another. To the extent
an insurer’s securities lending, derivatives trading, or fund activities present
149.
150.
151.

See FSOC METLIFE, supra note 81, at 7, 18, 20.
See FSOC AIG, supra note 96, at 2.
See, e.g., FSOC METLIFE, supra note 81, at 23.
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systemic risk, FSOC may be watching, whether the company specializes in life
insurance or in property/casualty coverage.
ii.

Consolidated Insurance Group Oversight

Another corollary of the term-mismatch discussion involves the regulatory
implications of holding company structure. The vast majority of U.S. insurance
companies are owned by holding companies—numbering about 320 groups152—
many of which combine insurance underwriters with noninsurance affiliates under
one roof. The holding company organization of modern insurance groups has
federal implications that state regulators cannot fully deflect.
First, to the extent an insurance group owns one or more federally insured
depository institutions, that group is a holding company subject to consolidated
supervision by the Federal Reserve Board. The Federal Reserve has oversight of
two types of depository institution holding companies: financial holding
companies (which own commercial banks) under the Bank Holding Company
Act153 and savings-and-loan holding companies (which own savings associations)
under the Savings and Loan Holding Company Act.154 Over the past few decades,
a number of large insurance underwriters acquired commercial bank or savings
institution affiliates. That trend continued during the financial crisis, when several
freestanding insurance companies acquired insured depository institutions in order
to qualify for TARP funds or access to discount window loans by the Federal
Reserve.155 Together, about twenty-one U.S. depository institution holding
companies were primarily engaged in insurance underwriting in mid-2013.156
Meanwhile, at least eight of the top 104 U.S. depository institution holding
companies (each having over $10 billion in assets) on June 30, 2014, were
primarily engaged in insurance underwriting.157
152. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 76, at 33.
153. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1852 (2012)). The Federal Reserve also supervises ordinary bank holding
companies under the same Act, but those holding companies cannot own insurance underwriters. Id.
154. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, 82 Stat.
5 (1968) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a to 1470 (2012)). Holding companies that own both
commercial and savings banks are bank holding companies that are regulated under the Bank Holding
Company Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(i)(1).
155. See, e.g., Charles Davis, Remaining TARP Hopefuls Still Waiting, LIFE INS. INT’L (May 11,
2009), http://www.lifeinsuranceinternational.com/news/remaining-tarp-hopefuls-still-waiting-2136
812030 [https://perma.cc/2VZ8-5SQS]; see also, e.g., The Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., supra note 82, at
21 (describing Hartford’s acquisition of Federal Trust Bank, a federally insured thrift institution, in
order to qualify for TARP funds); Lincoln Nat’l Grp., supra note 82, at 51 (describing Lincoln
National’s acquisition of Newton County Loan & Savings, FSB, a federally insured savings bank, in
support of its TARP application). In addition, certain other large insurance companies—including
Allstate Corp. and National Financial—own federally insured depository institutions. See Davis, supra,
at 2.
156. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 76, at 34.
157. Holding Companies with Assets Greater Than $10 Billion, NAT’L INFO. CTR.,
https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/HCSGreaterThan10B.aspx
[https://perma.cc/C9R82LE5] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016). MetLife, the sixth largest U.S. bank holding company in 2012, sold
its bank and deregistered as a bank holding company in 2013, probably to avoid designation as a SIFI.
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Before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Federal Reserve Board
had extremely limited authority over insurance subsidiaries of depository
institution holding companies. However, after the 2008 debacle, the Federal
Reserve Board’s reach over ordinary insurers who are part of financial holding
companies grew significantly. Specifically, in Dodd-Frank, Congress expanded the
Federal Reserve’s powers to examine consolidated depository institution holding
companies, including those owning insurers.158 The Board gained new authority to
examine all of a holding company’s subsidiaries, whether those companies are
depository institutions, functionally regulated subsidiaries such as insurers,159 or
some other type of affiliate. Importantly, the Board no longer has to make a
threshold showing that an insurance subsidiary poses a risk to a bank or thrift
affiliate or is suspected of violating the law before commencing an examination.
For the first time, the Board acquired the power to examine functionally regulated
subsidiaries engaged in commodities and/or swaps activities. The Board further
gained new authority to examine holding companies and all of their subsidiaries
for potential systemic risk.160
These new federal oversight powers are significant because any insurer
controlled by a depository institution holding company will be subject to federal
monitoring and examination under Dodd-Frank, regardless of size. Partly due to
this heightened federal presence, after 2010, some insurance groups divested or
changed the charters of their insured depository institutions to escape holding

See Dafna Avraham et al., A Structural View of U.S. Bank Holding Companies, 18 FED. RESERVE BANK
N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 65, 71 (2012); Press Release, MetLife, MetLife Sheds Bank Holding
Company Status with Approvals from the Federal Reserve and FDIC (Feb. 14, 2013),
http://investor.metlife.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=121171&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1785289
[https://perma.cc/3BMB-SKFY]. That strategy did not stop FSOC from naming MetLife as a SIFI
in 2014. See FSOC METLIFE, supra note 81.
158. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
604(b), (c)(1), (h)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1547 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a(b)(4)(A), 1844(c)(2),
(c)(5)(B)(v) (2012)).
159. Functionally regulated subsidiaries of depository institution holding companies include
insurance underwriters and securities underwriters.
160. Today, safety and soundness examinations of holding companies may be conducted for a
broad variety of statutory purposes. One of those purposes is to inform the Board of the nature of
the operations and financial condition of the holding company and the subsidiary. Another is to
gauge financial, operational, and other risks within the holding company system that may pose a
threat to the stability of the financial system of the United States or the safety and soundness of the
holding company or of any of its depository institution subsidiaries. Finally, safety and soundness
examinations are allowed to scrutinize the systems of the holding company for monitoring and
controlling the holding company’s risks. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 604(b), (h)(2), 124 Stat. 1547 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§
1467a(b)(4)(A)(i), 1844(c)(2)(A)(i) (2012)).
Under Dodd-Frank, the Board is also authorized to conduct compliance examinations to monitor the
compliance of the holding company and any of its subsidiaries with the Bank Holding Company Act
and federal laws that the Board has specific jurisdiction to enforce against the parent or the
subsidiary. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
604(b), (h)(2), 124 Stat. 1547 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a(b)(4)(A)(ii), 1844(c)(2)(A)(ii)
(2012)).
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company oversight by the Federal Reserve.161 That strategy backfired in MetLife’s
case, prompting FSOC to cite the company’s divestiture as a justification to
resubject MetLife to consolidated oversight as a SIFI.162 Insurance groups that
have other reasons to retain depository institution subsidiaries—for instance,
because those banks or thrifts are integral to their business models or because
those groups want access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window—will have to
live with the Federal Reserve’s expanded oversight. To the extent a shadow
banking activity is located directly within a financial holding company’s insurance
subsidiary, that activity is apt to garner closer scrutiny by the Federal Reserve.
Even when a large insurance group does not own a federally insured bank or
thrift and thus is not a depository institution holding company, it may still face the
risk of a SIFI designation where term-mismatch problems threaten the stability of
the U.S. financial system. In such instances, umbrella supervision of the entire
group is warranted for several reasons. One is to monitor any uptick in systemic
risk in the group’s individual units and to curtail that risk. Another is to police
interaffiliate transactions—such as loans or upstreamed dividends—that might be
used to finance systemically risky activities while jeopardizing the financial health
of the affected affiliates and their customers, including policyholders or
depositors. Safeguarding the parent company’s ability to serve as a financial source
of strength to subsidiaries that are insurance companies or banks is another
justification for consolidated oversight. The umbrella supervisor also needs to be
able to monitor and gauge counterparty exposures to the systemically risky
activities in question. Finally, the consolidated supervisor must be able to
coordinate (as best it can absent a global super-regulator) oversight of the crossborder activities and resolution of large, internationally active insurance groups.
Despite its many past missteps and lapses, the federal government is the only
U.S. regulator with the jurisdiction and capacity to carry out umbrella oversight of
insurance groups for systemic risk.163 No state regulator has full regulatory
jurisdiction over insurance holding companies or their noninsurance
subsidiaries.164 Instead, under state insurance holding company system regulatory
acts, state regulators only directly supervise licensed insurance subsidiaries within
insurance groups. Under the system called “windows and walls,” state insurance
departments use their oversight of regulated insurers to indirectly monitor certain
161. See Press Release, supra note 157; Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y of the Fed.
Reserve Bd., to Mr. Carlos R. Mello, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Prudential Bank & Trust, FSB
(Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/LegalInterpretations/bhc_changein
control20121031g.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE9U-HRQE] (allowing Prudential Financial, Inc., to
deregister as a savings and loan holding company).
162. See FSOC METLIFE, supra note 81, at 28 (“MetLife, Inc. has deregistered as a bank
holding company and MetLife is not currently subject to consolidated supervision.”).
163. See Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 1634–35. The European Union has struggled
with similar questions concerning whether to follow a decentralized network regulatory approach or a
centralized lead-agency model in crisis management. For an analysis of the merits of that debate
outside of the systemic risk context, see Arjen Boin et al., Building European Union Capacity to Manage
Transboundary Crises: Network or Lead-Agency Model?, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 418, 418 (2014).
164. See FSOC METLIFE, supra note 81, at 27.
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types of activities within the group. State departments have created “windows”
into group activities by obtaining or mandating information on the business
dealings of parent companies and noninsurer affiliates. This is accomplished
through a variety of methods, including reporting by insurers of financial
statements for the parent and all affiliates, the institution of an enterprise risk
report, assessments of group capital, examination authority over insurers and their
affiliates, memoranda of understanding with primary regulators of those other
entities, information gleaned from federal securities filings, and participation in
supervisory colleges for internationally active groups.165
Similarly, state regulators have set up “walls” by requiring review of specific
transactions between insurers and their affiliates to prevent holding companies
from inappropriately siphoning cash out of their insurance subsidiaries and to
protect the ability of those subsidiaries to pay their policyholders’ claims.
Transactions requiring advance approval include investment purchases,
reinsurance agreements, management and cost sharing agreement, tax allocation
agreements, some guarantees, intercompany investments, requests for
extraordinary dividends, and any other material transactions that could adversely
affect policyholder interests. Companies must also meet state requirements in
order to acquire insurance companies.166
Despite its touted virtues, this “windows and walls” system has major
shortcomings. The most serious drawback is its inward-looking focus. The
“windows and walls” approach naturally focuses on the worthy goal of keeping
insurance subsidiaries solvent and able to pay claims. But “windows and walls” do
not aspire to protect the larger financial system from outsize risks generated in the
noninsurance parts of an insurance group.167 The first-order problem posed by
165. FSOC baldly questioned the effectiveness of supervisory colleges in its MetLife opinion:
While supervisory colleges may allow state insurance regulators to monitor other parts of
an insurance organization, and may enhance communications of confidential supervisory
concerns across an enterprise, they are not equivalent to the supervisory and regulatory
authorities to which a nonbank financial company that the Council determines shall be
subject to supervision by the Board of Governors and enhanced prudential standards is
subject [sic], nor do they have direct supervisory authority over the holding company or its
non-insurance subsidiaries.
FSOC METLIFE, supra note 81, at 27–28.
166. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, THE U.S. NATIONAL STATE-BASED SYSTEM OF
INSURANCE FINANCIAL REGULATION AND THE SOLVENCY MODERNIZATION INITIATIVE ¶¶ 69–
81 (2013), http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_isftf_related_white_paper_state-based_
financial_reg_smi_130825.pdf [https://perma.cc/EZL7-HEPK]; Kris DeFrain, Insurance Group
Supervision, CIPR NEWSL. (Nat’l Ass’n Ins. Comm’rs & The Ctr. for Ins. Pol’y & Research, Kansas
City, MO), Apr. 2012, at 1, 3, http://www.naic.org/cipr_newsletter_archive/vol3_ins_group_
supervision.htm [https://perma.cc/JH2R-UX7P]; Group Supervision, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS
(2014), http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_group_supervision.htm [https://perma.cc/R98WZ6CL] (last updated Dec. 14, 2015); see also Memorandum from the Grp. Solvency Issues (EX)
Working Grp. to Director Christina Urias, Chair of the Solvency Modernization Initiatives (EX) Task
Force (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.naic.org/documents/index_smi_group_solvency_windows_and_
walls.pdf [https://perma.cc/J79Q-D7EB].
167. See, e.g., DeFrain, supra note 166, at 1, 3 (“Had it not been for the ‘walls’ that were
established in the United States, it is likely that the funds protecting policyholders in the AIG
insurance companies in the United States could have been raided by the AIG holding company,
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AIG-FP’s CDS dealings was the imminent threat of a global financial meltdown;
AIG-FP’s threat to the solvency of AIG’s insurance companies, while of very real
consequence, paled in comparison to that global threat.
This inward-looking focus of the “windows and walls” approach results
from limitations on the direct jurisdiction of state insurance commissioners over
the noninsurance affiliates of insurance company subsidiaries.168 Those
restrictions limit the effectiveness of the “windows and walls” system in several
ways. First, only twenty-four states had fully or substantially adopted the 2010
revisions to the NAIC Model Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory Act
as of November 2013 (the Model Act) that strengthened the group oversight
authority of state insurance commissioners. Worse, only seven states had
promulgated the 2010 revisions to the implementing regulation by that date.169 As
a result, many states are operating under older versions of the law and regulation,
further cramping the ability of some state insurance departments to keep apprised
of group activities outside of regulated insurance subsidiaries.
Second, even in states that have adopted the 2010 revisions, their
information-gathering powers are limited. State insurance departments can only
require periodic reports by insurance subsidiaries but not by parent companies or
noninsurance affiliates (other than enterprise risk reports, which parent companies
must file). Furthermore, insurance regulators do not collect comprehensive data
on insurance groups for a number of reasons. The Financial Stability Board
reported, for instance, that “[g]roup-wide consolidated data and the financial
statements of affiliates within an insurance group are not systematically collected
and data is usually only requested by regulators in those instances where it has
been produced for other mandated purposes.”170 According to the FSB, “[t]his
constrains the ability of the state authorities to effectively supervise all insurance
groups and to analyze events that might impact the group as a whole, absent a
framework for consolidated regulation and supervision.”171
Meanwhile, although the 2010 revisions to the Model Act require insurance
subsidiaries to gather information about activities and exposures throughout the

thereby threatening insurance policyholder protection.”; “the particular focus of regulation should be
on the insurer’s financial status”); FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 76, at 32 (insurance group
supervision in the United States “lack[s] a systemic focus”); FSOC METLIFE, supra note 81, at 27.
168. These jurisdictional challenges are even more difficult when an insurance subsidiary is
domiciled in one state and the holding company is incorporated in another state. See Insurance
Regulatory Update—Holding Company Supervision, Designation of Prudential Financial as Being “Too Big to Fail,”
Principle-Based Reserving and Captives, DUANE MORRIS (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.duanemorris.com/
alerts/insurance_regulatory_update_holding_company_supervision_principlebased_reserving_captives_5025.html [https://perma.cc/29AL-RRCD].
169. See Solvency Modernization Initiative (SMI), NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS,
http://www.naic.org/index_smi.htm [https://perma.cc/QP8U-YPN9] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016)
(discussing the 2010 revisions to the NAIC’s Model Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory
Act, No. 440, and the 2010 revisions to the NAIC’s Model Insurance Holding Company System
Model Regulation, No. 450).
170. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 76, at 36.
171. Id.
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group, those subsidiaries must rely on the kindness of their fellow affiliates to
obtain that information.172 Even the Model Act recognizes that this dependence
presents problems. Thus, the Model Act acknowledges that insurance subsidiaries
may not always be able to obtain “information not in the possession of the
insurer” that is requested by a state commissioner.173 In that event, the Model Act
states, “the insurer shall provide the [insurance] commissioner a detailed
explanation of the reason that the insurer cannot obtain the information and the
identity of the holder of information.”174 If the state insurance department
concludes that the explanation is “without merit,” it may fine the insurer or
suspend or revoke its license.175 The department may also examine the affiliates to
obtain the information or subpoena and depose “any person” for purposes of
determining compliance.176 However, the Model Act provides no agency sanctions
against any of the insurer’s affiliates for withholding requested information.177
Alarmingly, these restrictions resemble the similar limitations that the Federal
Reserve Board labored under unsuccessfully when supervising bank holding
companies before 2010 and indicate that the Model Act is not up to the task of
properly monitoring enterprise risk in insurance groups.
Third and in a related vein, the effectiveness of “windows and walls” also
depends on the existence of and cooperation of other primary regulators sharing
information. Some affiliates, however, are largely unregulated and do not have a
primary regulator. Meanwhile, turf wars, red tape, and lack of standardized data
may make cooperation harder and slower than expected.
Fourth, under the Model Act, state insurance regulators only have limited
authority to take enforcement action against group personnel outside of an
insurance subsidiary. Most of the sanctions in the Model Act are directed at

172. See Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory Act § 4(A)–(B) (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins.
Comm’rs 2015), http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-440.pdf [https://perma.cc/335G-GRJF];
Insurance Holding Company System Model Regulation With Reporting Forms and Instructions §§
14, 20, Form B (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2010), http://www.insurance.naic.org/store/free/
MDL-450.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9LS-T7ZR]. Section 4(F) of the Model Act does require “[a]ny
person within an insurance holding company system subject to registration . . . to provide complete
and accurate information to any insurer, where the information is reasonably necessary to enable the
insurer to comply with the provisions of this Act.” Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory
Act § 4(F). As I discuss below, however, the enforcement mechanisms for this duty are weak.
173. Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory Act § 6(B)(2) (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins.
Comm’rs 2014), http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-440.pdf [https://perma.cc/335G-GRJF].
174. Id.
175. Id. Elsewhere in the model act, Section 11(F) states that “[w]henever it appears to the
commissioner that any person has committed a violation of Section 3 of this Act [on registration and
disclosure] and which prevents the full understanding of the enterprise risk to the insurer by affiliates
or by the insurance holding company system, the violation may serve as an independent basis for
disapproving dividends or distributions and for placing the insurer under an order of supervision.” Id.
§ 11(F). Once again, however, these repercussions only apply to the insurer, not to its noninsurance
affiliates.
176. Id. § 6(E).
177. Id. § 6(B)(2), (E). See the discussion below for possible criminal sanctions against
individual holding company directors and officers.
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registered insurance affiliates or their officers, directors, employees, or agents.178
Directors and officers “of an insurance holding company system” do face
sanctions in two situations.179 First, any holding company system officer or
director who “knowingly violates, participates in, or assents to, or who knowingly
shall permit any of the officers or agents of the insurer to engage in” illegal
transactions or investments shall face monetary civil forfeitures.180 Second, any
officer, director, or employee of an insurance holding company system who
“willfully and knowingly subscribes to or makes or causes to be made any false
statements or false reports or false filings with the intent to deceive the
commissioner” will be subject to criminal prosecution, imprisonment and criminal
fines.181 The mens rea requirement of knowing or willful misconduct, however,
makes it difficult to muster the proof needed to impose any of these sanctions.
Meanwhile, state insurance commissioners have no authority under the Model Act
to sanction insurance group parent companies or noninsurer affiliates, either for
activities jeopardizing their insurance affiliates or for activities that threaten
systemic harm to financial firms other than affiliated insurers. Instead, “state
regulators rely on achieving outcomes indirectly via the regulated [insurers] of a
holding company.”182
Finally, nothing in the “windows and walls” system allows state regulators to
see the connections and monitor the exposures of counterparties outside of an
insurance group. Federal regulators were hamstrung during the Bear Stearns,
Lehman Brothers, and AIG crises because they lacked similar data on each firm’s
counterparty exposures with other financial firms. That experience showed that a
line of sight into interfirm exposures is essential for systemic risk oversight to be
effective. But state insurance regulators do not remotely have access to that
information, and, even if they did, they do not have the expertise, budget, or
staffing to monitor those interconnections successfully. Finally, the international
dimensions of systemic risk make it extremely difficult for other nations to reach
omnibus agreements with all fifty state insurance regulators.
Consequently, any time the activities of an insurance group threaten the
stability of the U.S. financial system—whether those activities are located within
an insurer or are restricted to a noninsurance affiliate—the U.S. government must
have the ability to monitor the situation from all angles and to act when necessary.
The question is not whether the federal government should oversee insurance for
possible systemic risk; rather, the question is the appropriate type of systemic risk
regulation and the relative roles of the federal government and state insurance
regulators in conducting that oversight.183
178. Id. § 11.
179. Id. § 11(B).
180. Id.
181. Id. § 11(E).
182. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 76, at 37; accord FSOC METLIFE, supra note 81, at 27.
183. State insurance regulators, for instance, will continue to play an essential role in the
microprudential regulation of individual insurance companies, which is a necessary part of systemic
oversight.
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Monitoring for systemic risk will likely be the first area where the federal
presence will expand over time. Currently, federal law only permits examinations
of insurance groups by the Federal Reserve Board where a group has been
designated a SIFI or owns an insured depository institution.184 But the need to
keep tabs on accumulations of systemic risk will create a broader need for federal
reporting by insurance conglomerates generally. Anticipating that need, DoddFrank gave FSOC the authority to direct the Office of Financial Research (OFR)
to collect information from nonbank financial companies (including insurance
companies) for the purpose of assessing the extent to which a financial activity or
financial market in which the firm participates, or the firm itself, poses a threat to
the financial stability of the United States.185 So far, OFR has flagged data gaps in
securities lending by insurance companies (and the associated reinvestment of
cash collateral), management of funds in separate accounts maintained by insurers,
and the financial condition of captive reinsurers as areas of concern.186 Potentially,
any added federal reporting requirements in these areas for the purpose of
systemic risk could apply to insurers across the board, regardless of size.
iii.

Across-the-Board Regulation of Systemically Risky Activities

A final implication of the concern over asset-liability mismatches is the
debate about how runs can lead to contagion. Contagion resulting from a run can
affect a failed institution’s short-term creditors and thus is a function of their
interconnectedness. But experts debate whether the spread of contagion to a
firm’s creditors requires more in order to spawn systemic risk. In particular, must
the institution and/or its counterparties also be large enough in size before
contagion will jeopardize U.S. or global financial stability?
The Dodd-Frank Act straddled this debate without resolving it. On the one
hand, Dodd-Frank expressly defined bank SIFIs based on size187 and instructed

184. Congress reaffirmed this need when it enacted provisions in Dodd-Frank giving the
federal government expanded authority to require additional reporting by certain insurance companies
in the wake of the crisis. As a consequence, all financial holding company subsidiaries—including any
insurers—must now provide reports and supervisory information that they provide to their primary
regulators to the Federal Reserve Board upon request. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 604(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1547, 1601 (2010) (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(1)(C) (2012)); see also id. § 604(c)(2) (repealing 12 U.S.C. § 1848a).
185. Id. §§ 112(a)(2)(A), (d)(3)(A), 154(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1394–95, 1396–97, 1416 (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 5322(a)(2)(A), (d)(3)(A), 5344(b)(1) (2012)).
186. OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL STABILITY
REPORT 67-94 (2015), https://financialresearch.gov/financial-stability-reports/files/OFR_2015Financial-Stability-Report_12-15-2015.pdf; OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 107–11 (2014), http://financialresearch.gov/annual-reports/
files/office-of-financial-research-annual-report-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3HW-3CT2]; OFFICE
OF F IN. RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF THE T REASURY , 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 80–83 (2013),
http://financialresearch.gov/annual-reports/files/office-of-financial-research-annual-report2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TLA-YHLU].
187. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§
115(a), 121(a), 155(d), 163(b), 165(j), 166(a), 172(a), 210(o)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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FSOC to consider size when designating nonbank SIFIs.188 Elsewhere, though,
Dodd-Frank and FSOC authorized the regulation of shadow banking activities
considered to be systemically risky without reference to the counterparties’ size.
Derivatives trading and money market funds are just two examples. These types of
systemic risk from insurance are not just limited to SIFIs. They can be found in
many corners of the insurance industry, regardless of a company’s size. Already,
this has led to across-the-board federal regulation of those underlying activities by
all financial services firms engaging in them, including insurers.
While this type of across-the-board regulation of discrete activities for
systemic risk is in its infancy, as it grows it will affect many or all insurance
companies enmeshed in those activities. At the same time, the McCarranFerguson Act may place limits on federal regulators’ ability to impose such
regulation on certain insurance company activities that pose systemic risk. Where a
traditional insurance product creates systemic risk—as FSOC asserted with respect
to redemption rights on life insurance policies—McCarran-Ferguson may preempt
the federal government from regulating that activity other than through a SIFI
designation (unless the activity falls within an exception to McCarran-Ferguson).
2.

Supply-Side Dynamics

As the previous section suggests, traditional discussions of systemic risk have
focused on the demand for financing through systemically risky financial
instruments, not the supply. In all likelihood, that is because the traditional
suppliers of short-term credit to commercial banks are depositors, and deposits
are viewed favorably for their essential role in providing liquidity through maturity
transformation and the payment system.189
In more recent debates over the dynamics of runs, however, analysts have
increasingly paid attention to the supply side of risky forms of capital.190 This new
line of inquiry stems from concerns about the role played by investors during the
run-up to the fall of 2008 when banks, insurance companies, and other regulated
institutional investors, in search of yield, became major suppliers of funds for
investment-grade subprime residential mortgage-backed securities, CDOs, and
credit derivatives. In too many cases, these investors took the creditworthiness of
those instruments on faith by placing undue reliance on credit agency ratings
instead of doing their own due diligence.191 When the credit rating agencies
downgraded those assets en masse due to defaults on the underlying mortgages or

188. Id. § 113(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 1398 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2) (2012)).
189. See E. GERALD CORRIGAN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, ARE BANKS
SPECIAL?: 1982 ANNUAL REPORT (1983), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/annualreports/ar/annual-report-1982-complete-text [https://perma.cc/LK4P-636N].
190. For an illuminating discussion of this problem, see Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 49,
at 1592–96.
191. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 46, at 58–61.
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securities that backed those assets, investors rushed to liquidate those investments,
setting off a loss of liquidity and a free fall in prices.192
To date, FSOC’s main concern has not been with investors’ supply of risky
credit per se, but instead with the effects on financial markets if those debt
instruments are rapidly liquidated en masse.193 When The Hartford and Lincoln
National sought and received TARP infusions after suffering massive losses in
their investment portfolios, the TARP payments highlighted the role played by
those and other insurers in financing some of the asset classes that jeopardized the
financial system in 2008. In response, federal regulators trained their sights on the
correlated presence of such assets in insurance company portfolios and the
potential domino effect if multiple institutional investors, including insurers,
sought to sell off those assets at once. One of FSOC’s justifications for
designating Prudential as a SIFI, for example, was that the “severity of the
disruption caused by a forced liquidation of Prudential’s assets could be amplified
by the fact that the investment portfolios of many large insurance companies are
composed of similar assets, which could cause significant reductions in asset
values and losses for those firms.”194 FSOC cited similar concerns with respect to
MetLife.195
Several potential consequences flow from this new attention to the supply
side of the equation. For one thing, federal regulators are increasingly likely to
increase reporting requirements to help them pinpoint the location of
accumulations of specific risky asset classes, regardless of who is funding them,
with no special carve-out for insurance companies. To the extent insurers come
under scrutiny for their role in financing any of those asset classes, that could
affect insurance company investment-portfolio decisions and the institutional and
regulatory dynamics driving those decisions. There would also likely be
implications for the risk weights assigned by the risk-based capital framework and
by the internal capital models for insurers.
As this discussion suggests, the new focus on systemic risk arising from
asset-liability term mismatches in insurance has numerous implications for the
possible expansion of the federal role in insurance regulation. To complicate this
picture, FSOC is espousing another theory of systemic risk in insurance that could
broaden these implications even further.
B. Systemic Risk Due to Other Causes of Macroeconomic Distress
The traditional definition of systemic risk in terms of runs is well ensconced
and will always raise grounds for concern. But recent federal pronouncements
foreshadow another, significantly broader theory of systemic risk that does not
depend on the threat of runs (either at the financial institution in question or at

192.
193.
194.
195.

See id. at 107–08, 111, 113–14.
See, e.g., FSOC PRUDENTIAL, supra note 96, at 6, 8–9.
Id. at 3, 9.
See FSOC METLIFE, supra note 81, at 25.
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one of its counterparties). Under this latter conception, known as substitutability,
systemic risk could arise in insurance where major market participants are so
dependent on a specific type of insurance coverage that widespread loss of that
coverage could have major adverse macroeconomic repercussions. So far this
discussion has been limited to broad market dependence on insurance coverage by
individual insurers. But if this logic becomes entrenched, it could extend to entire
insurance sectors as well.
This theory of systemic risk is considerably broader than the traditional
theory in at least two respects. First, some iterations of this broader theory focus
on whether an insurance company is unable or unwilling “to provide a critical
function or service relied upon by market participants and for which there are no
ready substitutes.”196 Under this formulation, FSOC could view certain voluntary
decisions by individual insurers—or whole insurance sectors—to exit the market
for coverage of a given “critical” risk as posing systemic risk and thus triggering
federal oversight.197 FSOC hinted at this in the written justification for AIG’s SIFI
designation, where it pointed to “the specialized policies underwritten by AIG’s
excess and surplus lines insurers,” which “could be difficult for competitors to
rapidly replace should AIG exit the market.”198
This rationale alludes to a broader issue that is inherent in all of insurance,
which is policyholders’ inability to procure other coverage for an insured risk once
that risk materializes. While FSOC’s discussion is not exactly coherent on this
score, the Council’s discussion of the millions of retirement-product customers
served by AIG and MetLife hinted at concerns about the ability of baby-boomer
customers to replace their AIG or MetLife annuities after retirement if either of
those companies defaulted on those obligations.199
In addition, this theory of systemic risk is broader than the theory based on
runs because it defines systemic risk according to the result—mass financial
distress to insureds or their third-party beneficiaries following loss of coverage—
instead of according to the cause of the loss of coverage. According to this wider
view, it is irrelevant whether loss of coverage is due to term mismatches or some
196. See FSOC AIG, supra note 96, at 6.
197. In the health insurance sector, of course, a similar pattern of private market exit led to
federal intervention in the form of Medicare, Medicaid, and the Affordable Care Act (with an added
overlay of ERISA regulation for health plans provided through workplaces). The same pattern of
federal intervention following loss of private coverage can be seen in segments of the market for
catastrophic risk, including nuclear accidents, flood damage, and terrorism risk. None of these
previous forays into federal intervention in insurance was justified in terms of systemic risk. FSOC’s
innovation consists of reframing the question by asking whether a decision by private insurers to exit
certain insurance markets could result in systemic harm.
198. FSOC AIG, supra note 96, at 8. FSOC pointed out in that regard that “AIG’s commercial
insurance policies cover many of the largest U.S. corporations, including 98 percent of the Fortune
500.” Id. Although FSOC did not technically rely on this rationale in its Prudential and MetLife
designations, it cited other market exit concerns in classifying both companies as SIFIs. See FSOC
PRUDENTIAL, supra note 96, at 10–11; FSOC METLIFE, supra note 81, at 25–26.
199. See FSOC AIG, supra note 96, at 6 (describing “AIG’s retail policyholders” as “including
over 18 million life insurance and retirement product customers in the United States”); FSOC
METLIFE, supra note 81, at 20–21(emphasizing MetLife’s 100 million retail policyholders worldwide).
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other reason resulting in an insurer’s insolvency, such as a spike in claims due to
correlated risks, other types of actuarial miscalculations or under-reserving,
undercapitalization, or portfolio losses. Any cause of insurance insolvency that
could inflict macroeconomic harm would give rise to systemic risk.
Intimations of this more expansive view of systemic risk can be seen in
FSOC’s decisions naming all three insurers as SIFIs. In the case of Prudential,
FSOC justified its SIFI designation in part because numerous corporations and
pension plans depended on coverage by Prudential to meet their pension
obligations:
Corporations, banks, and pension plans have exposures to Prudential
through retirement and pension products, corporate- and bank-owned
life insurance, and other group insurance products. Many employee
benefit retirement plans have large exposures to Prudential through
insurance and stable value products. Material financial distress at
Prudential could impair the ability of pension plans to meet certain
obligations to retirement plan participants.200
FSOC raised similar concerns regarding AIG:
AIG provides group annuities for private pension funds through its life
insurance subsidiaries, and its institutional business line offers stable
value wrap products. If AIG were to experience material financial
distress, the pension plan parties to these wrap contracts could be forced
to write down their assets from book to market value, resulting in costs
for the pension plan sponsors . . . and [putting] unprecedented strain on
the [state guaranty fund] system.201
It voiced similar comments in the case of MetLife:
[M]aterial financial distress at MetLife could force pension plans and
other institutional users of these products to write down certain of their
assets from book value to market value, which could result in significant
costs for the pension plans and potentially also for their institutional
sponsors.
....
The exposures of MetLife’s individual policyholders and institutional
customers could cause MetLife’s material financial distress to impair
those entities and affect financial market functioning and the economy.202
In proceeding down this path, FSOC proposed a sweeping new theory of systemic
risk that is not necessarily self-evident when applied to insurance. The pension and
annuity liabilities that FSOC identified should have a long tail. Absent any features
of those contracts that allow immediate cash redemptions, their payout should be
distributed over a long period of time. Due to this curve of anticipated payouts, if
AIG, Prudential, or MetLife were to founder, there would be a relatively long time
horizon to resolve policyholders’ claims as they came due.
200.
201.
202.

FSOC PRUDENTIAL, supra note 96, at 2.
FSOC AIG, supra note 96, at 6.
FSOC METLIFE, supra note 81, at 17, 21.
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Given the breathtakingly novel nature of this second definition of systemic
risk, FSOC is therefore obligated to explain exactly how loss of these types of
coverage by AIG, Prudential, or MetLife could threaten the financial stability of
the United States. Unfortunately, there is no explanation of that causal nexus in
any of the three insurance SIFI designations.203 FSOC did not explain why the
exposure of the companies’ annuity counterparties was so enormous that their
partial loss of coverage could actually trigger an economic downturn and, if so,
how. Nor did it provide sufficient facts about the companies’ market shares or the
relative market share and capacity of their pension and annuity product
competitors to allow outside observers to determine whether the insurers’ inability
to write new pension coverage due to insolvency would really trigger the risk of
recession.204 If coverage loss really does present systemic risk in certain
circumstances, FSOC also needs to explain why systemic risk supervision is the
answer instead of social insurance in which the federal government provides that
coverage itself.
For these reasons, FSOC’s stated justifications for this second, broader
theory of systemic risk leave a lot to be desired. There is another notable area,
namely financial guaranty insurance, where some of the concerns that FSOC
identified regarding the larger consequences of any type of insurer insolvency
actually came to pass during the 2008 financial crisis. What brought the bond
insurers down was not a classic mismatch between assets and short-term liabilities.
Rather, the bond insurers were hit with an avalanche of claims because they had
guaranteed a correlated risk—that is, the risk that RMBS and CDOs would
default. That risk was correlated because defaults on the underlying mortgages that
served as collateral pushed down housing prices, making other home mortgage
defaults more likely205 and increasing the probability of defaults on the RMBS and
203. See, e.g., VIEW OF THE COUNCIL’S INDEPENDENT MEMBER HAVING INSURANCE
EXPERTISE 2, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Dissenting%20
and%20Minority%20Views.pdf [https://perma.cc/94AQ-WS36] (“MetLife does not appear to
provide any critical financial service or product for which substitutes are unavailable.”).
204. In the retail context, none of the sample metrics identified in FSOC’s guidance about
how it will make nonbank SIFI designations addresses the causal nexus between market share and the
risk of a recession or financial meltdown. See Financial Stability Oversight Council, 12 C.F.R. App. A
pt. 1310.23 (2013).
205. As housing prices fell in response to mounting foreclosures, that pushed up the loan-tovalue ratios of neighboring properties. Higher loan-to-value ratios are strongly correlated with
increased default risk. See, e.g., U.S. GOV ’ T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-805, NONPRIME
MORTGAGES: ANALYSIS OF LOAN PERFORMANCE, FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH DEFAULTS, AND
DATA SOURCES 22 (2010); John Y. Campbell & João F. Cocco, A Model of Mortgage Default, 70 J. FIN.
1495 (2015); Yuliya Demyanyk, Quick Exits of Subprime Mortgages, 91 FED. RESERVE BANK ST. LOUIS
REV. 79, 79–92 (2009); Christopher Mayer et al., The Rise in Mortgage Defaults, 23 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES, no. 1, 2009, at 42–43; Anthony Pennington-Cross & Giang Ho, The Termination of
Subprime Hybrid and Fixed-Rate Mortgages, 38 REAL EST. ECON. 399, 413–16 (2010); John M. Quigley &
Robert Van Order, Explicit Tests of Contingent Claims Models of Mortgage Default, 11 J. REAL EST. FIN. &
ECON. 99, 104–12 (1995); Yuliya Demyanyk et al., Determinants and Consequences of Mortgage Default 12–
15 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 10-19R, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract_id=1699783; Ronel Elul et al., What “Triggers” Mortgage Default? 6–7, 11 tbl.1 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of Phila. Working Paper No. 10-13, April 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1596707;
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CDOs. Similar problems plagued private mortgage insurers, which suffered sharp
losses from the subprime and Alt-A residential mortgages they guaranteed in the
years leading to the 2008 financial crisis.206
While FSOC and FIO have been strangely silent on the subject of financial
guaranty insurers, concerns about private insurance of correlated risks have
prompted the IAIS, not surprisingly, to identify those insurers as possible
candidates for systemic risk oversight.207 Probably FIO and FSOC have been quiet
about designating financial guaranty insurers as SIFIs because the industry shrank
so drastically and is no longer insuring mortgage-backed securities in any
significant amount. In contrast, private mortgage insurers are continuing to insure
home mortgages, which may explain why FIO is calling for federal regulation of
private mortgage insurers.208
Nevertheless, financial guaranty insurers may come under renewed federal
scrutiny if housing finance reforms take flight. Recent congressional proposals for
housing finance reform would designate financial guaranty insurers as the first
loss guarantors in any new private-label RMBS system that emerges. If that were
to occur, these proposals would place the guarantors under federal safety-andsoundness supervision.209 Furthermore, in light of the events of 2008, financial
guaranty insurers that began to guarantee RMBS would also likely come under
scrutiny for systemic risk oversight, including SIFI designation.
If FSOC continues down this path, its focus on coverage losses that could
result in major macroeconomic repercussions, regardless of cause, has major
implications for the systemic oversight of insurance. There are many reasons why
a broad spectrum of policyholders could suffer loss of coverage. Major individual
insurers or entire insurance sectors could voluntarily exit a market for financial
reasons. In other circumstances, a dominant insurer’s insolvency could lead to
widespread, partial loss of coverage, both in the form of inadequate reserves for
current and future claims210 and in lost capacity to write future policies.

Christopher L. Foote et al., Negative Equity and Foreclosures: Theory and Evidence 10–11, 26 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of Bos. Pub. Pol’y Discussion Paper No. 08-3, 2008); Julapa Jagtiani & William W. Lang,
Strategic Default on First and Second Lien Mortgages During the Financial Crisis 16, 21 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Phila. Working Paper No. 11-3, 2010); Shane M. Sherlund, The Past, Present, and Future of Subprime
Mortgages 9–10, 24 tbl.5 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series Working Paper 2008-63,
2008).
206. See FIO MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 1, at 31–32.
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208. See FIO MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, 31–32.
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March
2014 Johnson-Crapo bill), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Bill.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6GKY-EN7V].
210. State guaranty funds may reimburse some of those losses. However, those funds impose
liability caps and do not cover certain lines at all. Commercial lines are especially vulnerable to lack of
state guaranty fund coverage. See Insurance Information Institute, Insolvencies/Guaranty Funds
(August 2015), http://www.iii.org/issue-update/insolvencies-guaranty-funds [https://perma.cc/
HWC3-FR2R ] (last visited April 1, 2016).
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Such insolvencies could occur for a host of reasons other than the unlikely
event of a run. Insurers may under-reserve due to wrong actuarial assumptions or
competitive underpricing. They may founder due to steep, unexpected losses in
their investment portfolios. Or they may suffer an avalanche of claims when
correlated risks materialize. Financial guaranty insurers, private mortgage insurers,
catastrophe insurers, and annuity insurers are especially susceptible to these types
of correlated risk.211 FSOC’s pronouncements to date suggest that it is considering
these other possible causes of insurance company insolvencies—in addition to any
risk of runs—when contemplating SIFI designations. Consequently, the grounds
for SIFI designations of insurers may be broader than the narrow focus on runs
would suggest and could implicate the federal government more deeply in the
solvency regulation of insurers.
As part of that involvement, this focus on insurance company insolvencies
could have major implications for a federal hand in capital adequacy standards for
insurers. Dodd-Frank already requires the Federal Reserve Board to set higher
capital standards for insurance group SIFIs.212 This requirement has been highly
controversial due to insurance industry fears that the Fed’s approach to capital
requirements will be too bank-centric and make the affected insurers less
competitive.213 While Congress addressed those concerns in late 2014 by
amending Dodd-Frank to relieve the Board from any obligation to impose banklike capital standards on insurance subsidiaries in nonbank SIFIs, the Board must
continue to impose risk-based capital and leverage standards at the group level.214
Meanwhile, FIO and the Federal Reserve have been intimately involved in
discussions of heightened global capital standards for internationally active
insurance groups (regardless of whether those groups have been designated SIFIs
by FSOC or G-SIIs by the IAIS).215 These twin developments could eventually
produce a two-tier framework of minimum capital regulation in insurance in
which larger, globally active insurance groups are subject to higher capital
requirements than smaller insurers. The competitive inequalities and incentives for
regulatory arbitrage that could result will produce pressure to harmonize the two
tiers of standards and give the federal government a larger voice in state capital
standards in the process.
CONCLUSION
The state-based model of U.S. insurance regulation has been remarkably
enduring to date, in part because the traditional rationales for a greater federal
role—efficiency, uniformity, and consumer protection—have not succeeded in
211. See Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 1592–94.
212. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§
165(b)(1)(A), (c), (k), 124 Stat. 1423, 1424–26, 1431–32 (2010).
213. See, e.g., Arthur D. Postal, Insurers Make Case Against ‘Bank-Centric’ Rules, But Others Urge
Caution, PROPERTY CASUALTY 360O (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2014/
03/11/insurers-make-case-against-bank-centric-rules-but [https://perma.cc/86MK-MZQJ].
214. 12 U.S.C. § 5371(c)(1)–(2) (2012).
215. See INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, supra note 120.
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displacing it. However, the 2008 financial crisis, the federal government’s
unprecedented bailouts of parts of the insurance sector, and the need for a
coordinated international approach radically shifted the terms of the debate by
supplanting the old concerns about efficiency, uniformity, and consumer
protection with a new, high-stakes imperative to control systemic risk. In the
process, solvency, which traditionally has been reserved to the states, is starting to
become subsumed under the systemic risk rubric. Unprepared and ill-equipped to
counter this tectonic shift in the logic of the debate, the states and the NAIC face
the biggest threat to their domination of U.S. insurance regulation in years.
Already, the federal government has made inroads into insurance regulation
for purposes of systemic risk oversight and global cooperation to contain that risk.
That federal incursion creates several potential openings for a broader federal role
in insurance than just SIFI regulation.
The least intrusive of those alternatives would be for the government to
impose new reporting obligations on some or all insurance companies and groups
to enable the government to locate and gauge accumulations of systemic risk. But
broader federal intervention is entirely possible and already in play. For example,
insurance groups engaged in activities that FSOC has tagged as systemically risky
can increasingly expect across-the-board federal regulation of those activities,
regardless of size. Already, derivatives trading and money market mutual funds are
the subject of such regulation and securities lending and asset management
(possibly even extending to insurance company separate accounts) may be next in
line.
FSOC’s preoccupation with redemption rights and guaranteed minimum
benefits in certain life insurance and annuity policies raises a further question of
whether FSOC might treat those types of policy features as systemic as well. There
is new and growing federal concern, moreover, over the systemic risk posed by
insurance group that effectively lower their minimum capital requirements by
ceding their insurance risks to their captive reinsurers.216 If the federal government
proceeded down either of these two paths, it would represent an unprecedented
incursion by Washington into state oversight of the substantive terms of insurance
contracts. In turn, any such initiative outside of the SIFI designation process
would raise thorny and contentious issues under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Consolidated insurance group oversight is another area where the drumbeat
for reform and the states’ inability to successfully deliver that reform could lead to
broader federal involvement in insurance regulation. Currently, most insurance
groups escape holding company regulation at the federal level because the federal
government’s authority over insurance holding companies is limited to SIFIs and
to depository institution holding structures. But there are good prudential reasons
216. See, e.g., FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE BREADTH AND SCOPE
OF THE GLOBAL REINSURANCE MARKET AND THE CRITICAL ROLE SUCH MARKET PLAYS IN
SUPPORTING INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (2014), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/
fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/FIO%20-%20Reinsurance%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
39D6-98WM]; FIO MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 1, at 32.
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and growing international pressure to subject more insurance groups to federal
control. The Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board are immersed
in those international discussions and in all likelihood concur with their
conclusions. More importantly, internationally active U.S. insurance groups face
the danger of growing intervention by the European Union if the European
Commission determines that state-based regulation does not provide equivalent
consolidated supervision of those groups. These groups could end up militating
for optional federal regulation in order to be able to substitute equivalent
consolidated supervision by the United States for E.U. regulation.217
Finally, solvency regulation of insurance companies is in the federal
government’s crosshairs for a variety of reasons that are swiftly coinciding.
FSOC’s vague, unconventional, and highly expansive theory positing systemic risk
from certain losses of coverage makes insurance company insolvencies a matter of
federal concern, regardless of their cause. To the extent that FSOC continues to
expound that novel theory of systemic risk, the federal government is likely to
agitate for a more dominant role in shaping capital standards for the insurance
industry, particularly for large insurance groups. FSOC’s scrutiny of insurance
companies’ potential role as financiers of systemically risky assets provides the
FSOC and the Federal Reserve Board with yet another justification for
scrutinizing the risk weights assigned under risk-based capital standards and
internal capital adequacy models.
At the same time, there are growing pressures for harmonization of capital
standards on the global front. The IAIS is increasing capital adequacy standards
for approximately fifty to sixty internationally active insurance groups
worldwide.218 This could directly affect U.S. insurers with overseas operations by
superimposing new, international capital standards on top of the risk-based capital
standards already mandated by the states. Meanwhile, the European Commission
has the power to impose added capital requirements on U.S. insurers with
European operations if it concludes that U.S. capital standards are not
“equivalent” to E.U. standards.219 These developments will create two sources of
pressure to harmonize the global capital standards with traditional state
requirements. First, there will be pressure for harmonization from internationally
active U.S. insurance enterprises, who will otherwise suffer a disadvantage with
their U.S. competitors who are not affected by the harsher global standards. And
global counterparts, including the FSB, the IAIS, and the European Union, will
continue to lean heavily on Washington to harmonize U.S. capital regulation of
insurers with the very different approach to capital regulation in the European
217. Indeed, in Dodd-Frank Congress created a similar option for federally regulated
securities holding companies to allow U.S. investment banks with European operations to avoid
direct regulation by the European Union. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 618, 124 Stat. 1616 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1850a
(2012)).
218. See FIO MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 1, at 24. This is a larger set of insurance
enterprises than the group designated as G-SIIs.
219. See id. at 27.
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Union.220 A formal initiative between the federal government and international
bodies called the “EU-U.S. Insurance Project” is already underway to achieve
convergence in U.S. and E.U. capital adequacy standards for insurance.221
This state of affairs produces an unstable equilibrium that is not within the
states’ control. Unless Congress repeals the relevant provisions of Dodd-Frank,
the Executive Branch now has broad unilateral authority to designate and regulate
individual insurance companies as SIFIs, to impose systemic risk reporting
requirements more generally on insurers, and to regulate at least some systemically
risky activities by insurers industry-wide. The federal government can also
negotiate insurance treaties222 and declare that federal treaties preempt state
insurance laws without permission from the states. States have little if any formal
power to stop these inroads.
Although the federal government’s powers only apply to narrow segments
and discrete activities of the insurance industry, nevertheless its toehold could
create competitive inequalities pitting insurers under federal purview against those
that are free from that oversight. The resulting market frictions could lead to
political pressure to produce a uniform set of insurance rules at the federal level,
threatening the states’ attempts to retain control. For the moment, consolidated
group oversight and capital adequacy rules are the most likely areas where an
unlevel playing field could occur, but other areas could emerge as well.
International pressures add to this instability. Technically, international fora
such as the IAIS and the FSB do not have the sovereign power to impose their
will on state regulators in the United States. However, their decisions are harder
for the states to shape and can gain traction in other ways. It is substantially easier
for the federal government—with its single voice and international heft—to exert
influence in those organizations than the loose and sometimes discordant
confederation of fifty state regulators. To the extent that global regulators
advocate federal regulation in lieu of regulation by the states, the federal
government will virtually almost always concur, adding fuel to international
recommendations for federal control. Any unilateral decision by the federal
government to adopt IAIS or FSB recommendations in the areas of insurance
regulation that it controls will give those recommendations teeth and exacerbate
competitive disparity among insurers. Meanwhile, the European Commission’s
power to declare aspects of U.S. insurance regulation not “equivalent” to E.U.
regulation is a real and looming threat to the competitive standing of U.S. insurers

220. In the United States, the states use a risk-based capital approach that assigns static risk
weights to different classes of assets. This “RBC” model only applies capital requirements to
individual insurance underwriters and not to insurance groups overall. In the European Union, in
contrast, insurance regulators have adopted a more dynamic model known as Solvency II that uses
statistical models to calculate a given insurer’s risk weights. Unlike the U.S. approach, Solvency II
computes capital levels both for individual insurers and for insurance groups. See id. at 25–26, 29, 34–
35.
221. See id. at 27–28.
222. Subject, of course, to concurrence by at least two-thirds of the Senate.
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with European operations. European Union actions are one more area that the
states cannot control.
This all bodes for growing tension in the allocation of authority over
insurance between the federal government and the states. While discussion of the
optimal design of future insurance regulation must be left for another time, a few
closing remarks are in order. The biggest danger in this fluid situation is the risk of
haphazard, incremental federal actions that gradually encroach on state regulation
(either de jure or de facto) without careful consideration of the costs of undermining
that system. Although the federal government is the only appropriate U.S.
regulator for the macroprudential supervision of systemic risk in insurance, this
does not necessarily make it the most appropriate regulator for the
microprudential oversight of that industry. The disastrous recent experience with
federal preemption in banking and the banking industry’s ease in capturing federal
prudential banking regulators are just two indications of the potential risks of a
unified federal regulatory system in insurance. Yet FSOC and the Federal Reserve
Board seem to have given little if any consideration to how their regulatory
initiatives could complement and strengthen state-based insurance regulation,
instead of slowly eroding it. The time has come to have a serious, formal national
discussion on the best way to design U.S. insurance regulation going forward.
Otherwise, our nation will risk drifting toward a fractured and fractious oversight
system that is worse than what preceded it.
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